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Intelligence collection must always evolve to meet technological
developments. Following the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President
George W. Bush authorized several surveillance programs to enhance
intelligence collection on the severe threats facing the United States.1 However,
these programs appeared to be inconsistent with the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act of 1978 (FISA), which governed intelligence collection that
occurred inside the United States.2 Technology had evolved in the intervening
decades in a manner that could not have been foreseen by FISA’s drafters and
the statute was implicated by intelligence collection efforts that were likely
never intended to be covered by the original statute. These outdated provisions
posed significant challenges for the Intelligence Community. Ultimately,
Congress passed the Protect America Act of 2007 (PAA) as a stop-gap measure,
and the FISA Amendments Act of 2008 (FAA) to enable the government to
target non-United States persons reasonably believed to be outside the United
States to collect foreign intelligence information.3 Section 702 of the FAA is
likely the most important statutory tool for intelligence collection, especially
against terrorism, and is vital for protecting United States national security. In
2018, there were more than 164,000 Section 702 targets. 4 The Intelligence
Community would simply not be able to maintain nearly the same level of
intelligence collection without Section 702. Further, Section 702 allows for
collection to occur in a stable and safe domestic environment and can yield intact
copies of the entirety of communications. This has been an extraordinary
1. OIG, DEP’T OF DEFENSE ET AL., REPORT NO. 2009-0013-AS, UNCLASSIFIED REPORT ON
PRESIDENT’S SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM 4–14 (2009), https://oig.justice.gov/
special/s0907.pdf [hereinafter OIG, DOD, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM].
2. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, 92 Stat. 1783, 1785,
1790 (codified at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1801, 1805 (2012)).
3. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Amendments Acts of 2008, Pub. L. No.
110-261, § 702, 122 Stat. 2436, 2438 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2012)); Protect
America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 105B, 121 Stat. 552, 552–54 (codified as amended at
50 U.S.C. § 1801 (2007)).
4. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATISTICAL TRANSPARENCY REPORT
REGARDING THE USE OF NATIONAL SECURITY AUTHORITIES FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2018 13
(2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/CLPT/documents/2019_ASTR_for_CY2018.pdf [hereinafter
DNI, TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2018].
THE
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success story for United States signals intelligence (SIGINT) and developed as
a response to changing technology and a new threat landscape.
While the collection programs under Section 702 have produced a great deal
of valuable intelligence over the last decade, the United States must begin to
think about foreseeable technological developments and strategically consider
how to conduct SIGINT collection in the future. This Article identifies four
technological trends that could significantly impact the way the United States
conducts SIGINT. Individuals now have access to sophisticated technologies
that formerly only governments seemed capable of creating, and this
decentralization of capabilities will likely only increase in the future. The
increased prevalence of anonymity and location-spoofing technologies offer
benefits to individual users but may create significant difficulties for the
Intelligence Community in determining the location of targets, which is a
fundamental aspect of the current legal regime governing SIGINT activities.
Also, the United States’ “home field” advantage is receding. This trend means
that the United States will have a smaller share of the world’s communications
traffic transit its physical infrastructure, which will reduce the Intelligence
Community’s ability to acquire precise and intact communications by serving
directives on United States companies. The push towards data localization laws
may further reduce the United States’ home field advantage. Finally, technology
companies have begun to innovate in a manner that reduces their capability to
respond to lawful government orders. Technology companies are increasingly
adopting encryption technologies and may shift data overseas to try to avoid
complying with lawful surveillance orders. Decisions by major private sector
technology companies have the ability to shift how SIGINT is collected.
If a person’s true location becomes increasingly more difficult to ascertain,
the law should adapt to the uncertainty of location. This Article analyzes several
possible reforms. Some have argued that the Fourth Amendment should apply
to all individuals or that the Fourth Amendment should be presumed to apply
unless that government can establish that no party to the communication is a
United States person.5 In a world in which location becomes extremely difficult
to determine accurately, the FISA legal regime governing SIGINT activities
could create a new category for non-United States persons appearing to be
located in the United States. These individuals would be legitimate targets if the
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (FISC) determined on an individualized
basis that there is reasonable suspicion to believe that these individuals are likely
to possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign intelligence information.
Alternatively, if anonymity and location-spoofing technologies become more
advanced and are widely adopted such that determining location becomes an
extreme problem for SIGINT collection under Section 702, it could be necessary
to reform FISA by creating two categories, one for United States persons and
5. See, e.g., David Cole, We Are All Foreigners: NSA Spying and the Rights of Others, JUST
SEC. (Oct. 29, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/2668/foreigners-nsa-spying-rights/; Jennifer
Daskal, The Un-Territoriality of Data, 125 YALE L.J. 326, 383 (2015).
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one for non-United States persons. The more security-oriented reforms would
push the limits of the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant clause in the
Fourth Amendment. Ultimately, this Article concludes that the best reform
approach in a world in which location becomes extremely difficult to determine
accurately would be to reform FISA to create a new category for non-United
States persons appearing to be located in the United States, though it may be
necessary to go even further depending on the severity of the problem. In
addition to legislative reforms, it may be prudent to create more forward leaning
procedures to ease some of the difficulties that could be caused by increased
uncertainty of the location of targets.
Finally, as Section 702 becomes less useful in the future, the Intelligence
Community must improve collection under Executive Order 12333 to ensure
that the government continues to acquire vital intelligence to protect United
States national security interests. The National Security Agency (NSA) must
continue to invest resources in being able to decrypt communications and
acquiring unencrypted communications. The United States government should
continue to work to develop strong relationships with United States technology
companies and seek to reduce the strains that have been created in the aftermath
of the Snowden disclosures. Also, as SIGINT collection under Executive Order
12333 becomes more important, the Intelligence Community must increase its
focus on obtaining the cooperation of foreign entities and compromising key
strategic targets. Beyond enhancing SIGINT collection capabilities, the
Intelligence Community must focus on improving the ability to conduct
intelligence analysis at scale by investing in technological tools that can assist
with this work.
This Article proceeds in six parts. Part I recounts the history that led to the
enactment of Section 702. This part describes how SIGINT collection under
Section 702 operates and analyzes why this has been such an enormously
important intelligence authority.
Part II describes the technological
developments that could change how the United States conducts SIGINT in the
future. The increased prevalence of anonymity technologies, increased
prevalence of location-spoofing technologies, reduction in the United States’
home field advantage, and technological innovations by companies that reduce
their ability to comply with government surveillance orders all challenge the
effectiveness of Section 702.
Part III proposes strategies to address the difficulties in accurately
determining location presented by anonymity and location-spoofing
technologies. This part analyzes several legislative and procedural reform
proposals. Part IV encourages the Intelligence Community to pursue a number
of strategies to enhance Executive Order 12333 SIGINT collection to ensure that
the government continues to acquire vital intelligence to protect United States
national security interests even as Section 702 becomes less useful. Finally, Part
V offers concluding remarks about how the United States should reform the laws
and procedures governing SIGINT collection and shift intelligence collection
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and analysis efforts under Executive Order 12333 to protect United States
national security interests.
I.

THE ORIGINS AND IMPORTANCE OF SECTION 702
A.

The History of Section 702

In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks, President George
W. Bush authorized the NSA to collect the contents of international
communications between people inside and outside the United States without a
FISC order under the Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP).6 In 2005, the New
York Times revealed the existence of the TSP and the program faced numerous
legal challenges.7 The original FISA statute had defined electronic surveillance
to include the acquisition of the contents of wire communication when at least
one party is in the United States and the collection itself occurs in the United
States, and compelled the government to obtain approval from the FISC to
conduct electronic surveillance for foreign intelligence purposes inside the
United States.8 The original FISA statute required the government to establish
probable cause that “the target of the electronic surveillance is a foreign power
or an agent of a foreign power;” probable cause that “each of the facilities or
places at which the electronic surveillance is directed is being used, or is about
to be used, by a foreign power or an agent of a foreign power;” that the “proposed
minimization procedures” are consistent with the statutory requirements; and
that the information could not “reasonably be obtained by normal investigative
techniques.”9 The President relied on his inherent Article II authority under the
Constitution as the Commander in Chief and sole organ of the country to conduct
foreign affairs, and the existence of the 2001 Authorization for Use of Military
Force (AUMF) as legal justifications for the TSP, which appeared to be
inconsistent with FISA.10

6. OIG, DOD, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 1, at 4–14.
7. James Risen & Eric Lichtblau, Bush Lets U.S. Spy on Callers Without Courts, N.Y.
TIMES (Dec. 16, 2005), http://www.nytimes.com/2005/12/16/politics/bush-lets-us-spy-on-callerswithout-courts.html?mcubz=0; e.g., ACLU v. NSA, 438 F. Supp. 2d 754, 782 (E.D. Mich. 2006)
(holding that the TSP violated the First and Fourth Amendments), vacated, 493 F.3d 644 (6th Cir.
2007); see ACLU v. NSA, 493 F.3d 644, 648 (6th Cir. 2007) (finding that the plaintiffs lacked
standing and reversing the district court’s decision).
8. FISA § 101(f)(2), 92 Stat. at 1785, 1790.
9. Id. §§ 104–05, 92 Stat. 1790. Minimization procedures are a set of rules that dictate how
a government agency will limit the accessibility, retention, and dissemination of inadvertently
acquired material concerning United States persons who are not the target of the surveillance. §
101(h).
10. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, LEGAL AUTHORITY SUPPORTING THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY DESCRIBED BY THE PRESIDENT
2 (2006),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2006/01/31/nsa-white-paper.pdf.
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In January 2007, the government sought and obtained an order from the FISC
authorizing the government to conduct certain electronic surveillance when “the
government made a probable cause determination regarding one of the
communicants, and the email addresses and telephone numbers to be tasked
were reasonably believed to be used by persons located outside the United
States.”11 When the government sought to renew this order in May 2007, a
different FISC judge approved the program, but under a different legal theory,
which required changes to the program. The May 2007 FISC order required that
the FISC, instead of the government, make the probable cause determination.12
This ruling led NSA analysts to be “significantly divert[ed] . . . from their
counterterrorism mission to provide information to the Court,” and then-Director
of National Intelligence (DNI) Vice Admiral (Ret.) Mike McConnell determined
that it “degraded capabilities in the face of a heightened terrorist threat
environment.”13
In addition to the TSP, the government used FISA to obtain court orders,
based on probable cause, authorizing surveillance against individuals suspected
of engaging in terrorist activities located outside the United States who used
United States-based communications service providers. 14 The government
expended “considerable resources” to meet FISA’s requirement that it
demonstrate there was probable cause to believe that these individuals were
agents of a foreign power, which included international terrorist organizations,
and used the specific communication facility that the government sought to
surveil. 15 The necessity of drafting applications that met the probable cause
standard “slowed down and in some cases prevented the acquisition of foreign
intelligence information.” 16 Then-DNI McConnell complained that it took

11. PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., REPORT ON THE SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE
ACT
17
(2014),
https://www.nsa.gov/about/civilliberties/resources/assets/files/pclob_section_702_report.pdf
[hereinafter PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM];
see also Certification of Michael B. Mukasey, Att’y Gen. of the United States at para. 37, In re
NSA Telecomms. Records Litig. (N.D. Cal. May 5, 2014) (No. 4:08-cv-04373-JSW), ECF No.
219,
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0505/AG%20Mukasey%202008%20Declassified%20Decla
ration.pdf [hereinafter AG Mukasey Certification].
12. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 17; AG Mukasey
Certification, supra note 11, at para. 38.
13. S. SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF
1978 AMENDMENTS ACTS OF 2007, S. REP. NO. 110-209, at 5 (2007).
14. Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Hearing on S. 110-399 Before S.
Select Comm. on Intelligence, 110th Cong. 29–30 (2007) (statement of Kenneth L. Wainstein,
Assistant Att’y Gen., Nat’l Sec. Div., Dep’t of Justice) [hereinafter Hearing on Modernizing FISA].
15. Id.
16. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 18.
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“about 200 man hours to do [a FISA application for] one telephone number.”17
The targeted individuals were foreigners, though, and were not intended to be
protected by FISA when the statute was originally enacted in 1978. FISA was
intended to provide privacy protections for Americans and guard against
domestic political abuse, not protect foreigners whose only connection to the
United States was that they were using United States-based communications
service providers.18 Yet, technology had evolved in a manner that could not have
been foreseen by FISA’s drafters and the statute was implicated by intelligence
collection efforts directed at individuals outside the United States.
When FISA was originally enacted, domestic communications were almost
entirely carried on a wire and international communications were wireless, radio
communications. 19 FISA therefore closely regulated the collection of wire
communications and less-stringently regulated the collection of radio
communications. 20 However, technology shifted and international
communications mostly traveled over physical cables—especially fiber optic
cables—and domestic communications increasingly became transmitted
wirelessly.21 This meant that FISA ended up covering a significant amount of
foreign intelligence collection activities targeting foreigners overseas that the
statute was never actually intended to cover because of the statute’s focus on
how a communication was transmitted and where it was intercepted. Further,
there was an enormous increase in commercial technologies that consumers
could use, and consumers were able to use and change e-mail addresses and
telephone numbers frequently across services.22 This created
a significant challenge for intelligence services which, under FISA
1978, had to obtain explicit approval for each and every selector they
wanted to target. In 2008, there was a growing body of evidence that
terrorists were making effective use of this agility, acquiring and
17. Chris Roberts, Transcript: Debate on the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, EL PASO
TIMES
(Aug.
22,
2007,
1:05
AM),
https://www.eff.org/files/filenode/att/
elpasotimesmcconnelltranscript.pdf.
18. See H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE
SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978 AMENDMENTS ACTS OF 1978, H.R. REP. NO. 95-1283, at 68 (1978)
(describing the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence’s (HPSCI) consensus view that
a “judicial warrant should be required whenever the [F]ourth [A]mendment rights of Americans
might be involved”); RICHARD A. CLARKE ET AL., LIBERTY AND SECURITY IN A CHANGING
WORLD: REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE PRESIDENT’S REVIEW GROUP ON
INTELLIGENCE
AND
COMMUNICATIONS
TECHNOLOGIES
67–68,
(2013),
https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/sites/default/files/docs/2013-12-12_rg_final_report.pdf
(describing FISA’s safeguards against domestic misuse and politicization).
19. Hearing on Modernizing FISA, supra note 14, at 29.
20. CHRIS INGLIS & JEFF KOSSEFF, HOOVER INST., IN DEFENSE OF FAA SECTION 702 5
(2016), https://www.hoover.org/research/defense-faa-section-702.
21. Hearing on Modernizing FISA, supra note 14, at 29; INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20,
at 5.
22. INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 5.
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shedding e-mail addresses and telephone numbers faster than US
intelligence services could prepare, submit, and obtain required
selector-by-selector approvals.23
In addition to the challenges posed by shifts in technology that rendered the
original FISA outdated, global communications had evolved in a way that
offered the United States a “home field” advantage.24 Internet traffic was broken
own into packets, which were transmitted based on the most efficient path, rather
than linear geographic path between the sender and recipient.25 Packets could
travel around the world en route from the sender to the recipient, which
presented the United States with a tremendous intelligence collection
opportunity because a large amount of Internet traffic passed through equipment
physically located in the United States.26 This provided the United States with
an opportunity to obtain foreign intelligence targets’ communications from a
stable and safe domestic environment instead of difficult circumstances
overseas. 27 The Bush administration ultimately proposed modifications to
FISA in spring 2007.28 Congress passed the PAA to authorize the TSP by
ensuring that “electronic surveillance” would not be defined to include
“surveillance directed at a person reasonably believed to be located outside of
the United States.”29 Under the PAA, the FISC no longer had jurisdiction over
surveillance targeted at such individuals. Instead, the DNI and the Attorney
General had the power to authorize such surveillance, and the FISC’s only role
was to ensure that the procedures for determining the surveillance was targeted
at persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States were not “clearly
erroneous.”30
Congress then passed the FAA when the PAA expired to enable the
government to target non-United States “persons reasonably believed to be
located outside the United States to acquire foreign intelligence information.”31
Unlike traditional FISA surveillance, surveillance under Section 702 of the FAA
did not require a probable cause standard that the target was a foreign power or

23. Id.
24. FISA for the 21st Century: Hearing on S. 109-1055 Before S. Comm. on the Judiciary,
109th Cong. 6–10 (2006) (statement of Michael V. Hayden, Dir., Cent. Intelligence Agency)
[hereinafter FISA for the 21st Century Hearing].
25. Id.
26. Id.; John Markoff, Internet Traffic Begins to Bypass the U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 29, 2008),
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/08/30/business/30pipes.html.
27. See FISA for the 21st Century Hearing, supra note 24, at 9; INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra
note 20, at 4.
28. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 19.
29. Protect America Act of 2007, Pub. L. No. 110-55, § 105A, 121 Stat. 552, 552 (codified
as amended at 50 U.S.C. § 1805a (2007)).
30. Id. § 105C(c), 121 Stat. at 555.
31. FISA § 702, 122 Stat. at 2438.
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agent of a foreign power and did not require individual FISC orders.32 Section
702 only required the Attorney General and DNI to obtain approval for the
targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and certifications from the
FISC, which then enabled the government to compel cooperation by issuing
directives to companies. 33 The legal standard under Section 702 was less
stringent than FISA Title I surveillance, which was focused primarily on United
States persons, and the judicial oversight occurred less frequently than under
FISA Title I. Once the government obtained certification from the FISC under
Section 702, the government could then issue directives to private sector
companies to compel the companies to cooperate with the government in the
surveillance.34
B.

How Section 702 Operates

Under Section 702, NSA analysts identify non-United States persons who are
reasonably believed to be located outside the United States as potential targets
for gathering foreign intelligence regarding a purpose that the FISC has certified.
Analysts apply the NSA’s targeting procedures “to make a determination
regarding the assessed location and non-U.S. person status of the potential target
(the foreignness determination) and whether the target possesses and/or is likely
to communicate or receive foreign intelligence information authorized under an
approved certification (the foreign intelligence purpose determination).”35
The analyst must first identify the specific selector (such as an email address
or telephone number) that is used by the target.36 The analyst then checks to
verify that the target is indeed a non-United States person reasonably believed
to be located outside the United States and that the target is connected to the
selector. 37 The foreignness determination is based on the “totality of the
circumstances” and NSA analysts must consult multiple sources in making the
determination.38 NSA procedures require “analysts [to] conduct ‘due diligence’”

32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.

Id.
Id. § 702(d), (e), (g), 122 Stat. at 2439.
Id. § 702(h), 122 Stat. at 2442.
PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 43.
INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 10.
NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FOR
TARGETING NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED OUTSIDE
THE UNITED STATES TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION
702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 1 (2018),
https://www.intelligence.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/declassified/2018_Cert_NSA
_Targeting_27Mar18.pdf [hereinafter NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2018]. See INGLIS &
KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 10.
38. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 43; see NSA,
TARGETING PROCEDURES 2018, supra note 37, at 1.
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in making the foreignness determination. 39 The Privacy and Civil Liberties
Oversight Board (PCLOB) has recognized that
[w]hat constitutes due diligence will vary depending on the target;
tasking a new selector used by a foreign intelligence target with whom
the NSA is already quite familiar may not require deep research into
the target’s (already known) U.S. person status and current location,
while a great deal more effort may be required to target a previously
unknown, and more elusive, individual.40
The NSA has specifically used an Internet Protocol (IP) filter with at least
“upstream” collection to limit acquisition “to Internet transactions that originate
and/or terminate outside the United States.”41 If there is conflicting information
regarding whether the target is located inside the United States or is a United
States person, the conflict “must be resolved,” and the analysts must determine
that the potential target is a “non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be located
outside the United States prior to targeting.”42 In making the foreign intelligence
purpose determination, NSA analysts must determine “that the target is expected
to possess, receive, and/or is likely to communicate foreign intelligence
information concerning a foreign power or foreign territory.”43 NSA analysts
must document their foreignness determinations and foreign intelligence purpose
determinations, and two senior NSA analysts must approve the request before a
service provider may be compelled to provide the communications associated
with a tasked selector.44
After a selector has been tasked, the selector is sent to an electronic
communications service provider so that acquisition can occur. 45 Two
collection programs comprise Section 702 acquisition: “downstream” collection
(which was formerly referred to as PRISM) and “upstream” collection. With

39. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 43.
40. Id. at 43–44.
41. NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY AGENCY FOR
TARGETING NON-UNITED STATES PERSONS REASONABLY BELIEVED TO BE LOCATED OUTSIDE
THE UNITED STATES TO ACQUIRE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION PURSUANT TO SECTION
702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS AMENDED 2 (2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/51117/2016_NSA_702_Targeting_Procedures_Mar_3
0_17.pdf [hereinafter NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017].
42. INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 10. See PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE
PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 44; PRIVACY & CIVIL LIBERTIES OVERSIGHT BD., TRANSCRIPT OF
PUBLIC HEARING REGARDING THE SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM OPERATED PURSUANT TO SECTION
702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 40–42 (2014) (statement of Raj De, Gen.
Counsel, Nat’l Sec. Agency), https://www.pclob.gov/library/20140319-Transcript.pdf [hereinafter
PCLOB, TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC HEARING].
43. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 4.
44. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 45–46; INGLIS &
KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 11.
45. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 7.
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downstream collection, the government compels an electronic communications
service provider to turn over the communications that are sent “to” or “from” a
specific selector. 46 Under upstream collection, the government compels
companies that operate “the telecommunications ‘backbone’ over which
telephone and Internet communications transit” to turn over communications that
are sent “to” or “from” (and formerly “about”) a specific selector.47
The NSA’s targeting procedures also require post-tasking analysis to ensure
that the person targeted remains a non-United States person overseas and that
acquisition against the tasked selector only continues to the extent that the
government assesses the tasking is likely to acquire foreign intelligence
information.48 Analysts must review content for indications that a target is a
United States person, has entered the United States, or intends to enter the United
States.49 To ensure that analysts conduct this review, “[t]he NSA has developed
automated systems to remind analysts to review collection from email addresses
and comparable selectors within five business days after the first instance that
data is acquired for a particular tasked selector, and at least every 30 days
thereafter.”50 If the NSA determines that a person that was first “reasonably
believed to be located outside the United States” was actually inside the United
States after targeting, or if the NSA determines that a person “believed to be a
non-United States person” was actually a United States person after targeting, the
NSA must promptly detask the selectors used by that individual, which
terminates the acquisition directed at those selectors.51 The data acquired from a
selector that the NSA learned after targeting was used by a United States person
or person located inside the United States is destroyed unless the Director of the
NSA determines—on a communication-by-communication basis—that the
sender or intended recipient had been properly targeted and the “communication
is reasonably believed to contain significant foreign intelligence information,” “is
46. See id. (explaining PRISM collection); see also NSA Stops Certain Section 702
“Upstream” Activities, NAT’L SEC. AGENCY (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.nsa.gov/newsfeatures/press-room/Article/1618699/nsa-stops-certain-section-702-upstream-activities/
(explaining that PRISM collection is now referred to as “downstream” collection).
47. See PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 7 (explaining
“upstream” collection). Upstream collection previously included the acquisition of “about”
communications where the selector of a target was contained in the communication, but the NSA
ended “about” collection in April 2017 because of trouble complying with FISC regulations.
Charlie Savage, N.S.A. Halts Collection of Americans’ Emails About Foreign Targets, N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/28/us/politics/nsa-surveillance-terrorismprivacy.html; NSA Stops Certain Foreign Intelligence Collection Activities Under Section 702,
NAT’L SEC. AGENCY (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/press-room/pressreleases/2017/nsa-stops-certain-702-activites.shtml; NSA Stops Certain Section 702 “Upstream”
Activities, supra note 46.
48. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 6–8.
49. Id. at 7.
50. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 48.
51. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 9–10.

64

Catholic University Law Review

[Vol. 69:53

reasonably believed to contain evidence of a crime,” is reasonably believed to
contain data to be used for cryptanalytic purposes or technical information
necessary to understand a communications security vulnerability, or “contains
information pertaining to an imminent threat of serious harm to life or
property.”52 The NSA may notify “the FBI [Federal Bureau of Investigation] that
a target has entered the United States so that the FBI may seek [a] traditional
FISA [Title I order] or take other lawful investigative steps.”53
C. The Importance of Section 702
Section 702 is likely the most important statutory tool for intelligence
collection, particularly on terrorism, and is vital for protecting United States
national security.54 In 2018, there were more than 164,000 Section 702 targets.55
Section 702 enables the Intelligence Community to collect intelligence on nonUnited States persons that it reasonably believes are overseas when it reasonably
believes it will acquire foreign intelligence from surveilling these individuals.
The Intelligence Community is not required to establish probable cause that the
targeted individual is an agent of a foreign power, nor that each facility is being
used or is about to be used by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, nor
that the information could not be reasonably obtained by normal investigative
methods. 56 The probable cause requirement in FISA Title I is a protection
derived from the Fourth Amendment, but non-United States persons that are
52. NAT’L SEC. AGENCY, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES USED BY THE NATIONAL SECURITY
AGENCY IN CONNECTION WITH ACQUISITIONS OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION
PURSUANT TO SECTION 702 OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT OF 1978, AS
AMENDED
10–12
(2018),
https://www.intel.gov/assets/documents/702%20Documents/
declassified/2018_Cert_NSA_Minimization_18Sep18.pdf [hereinafter NSA, MINIMIZATION
PROCEDURES 2018].
53. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 50; see NSA,
MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES 2018, supra note 52, at 12.
54. Press Release, Nat’l Sec. Agency, The National Security Agency: Missions, Authorities,
Oversight and Partnerships (Aug. 9, 2013), https://www.nsa.gov/news-features/pressroom/statements/2013-08-09-the-nsa-story.shtml (stating “[t]he collection under FAA Section 702
is the most significant tool in the NSA collection arsenal for the detection, identification, and
disruption of terrorist threats to the U.S. and around the world”); see OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L
INTELLIGENCE & DEP’T OF JUSTICE, THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY’S COLLECTION PROGRAMS
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT 6 (2012),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Ltr%20to%20HPSCI%20Chairman%20Rogers%20and%20
Ranking%20Member%20Ruppersberger_Scan.pdf (summarizing the importance of SIGINT
collection under Section 702).
55. DNI, TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2018, supra note 4, at 13.
56. Compare FISA § 702, 122 Stat. at 2438 (authorizing SIGINT collection targeting nonUnited States persons reasonably believed to be overseas to acquire foreign intelligence
information), with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-511, §§ 102, 104–
05, 92 Stat. 1783, 1786–90 (codified as amended at 50 U.S.C. §§ 1802, 1804–05 (2018))
(authorizing foreign intelligence collection under FISA Title I and establishing the legal
requirements for conducting such SIGINT activities).
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reasonably believed to be overseas are not entitled to Fourth Amendment
protections.57 Without Section 702, the Intelligence Community would likely
be unable to amass sufficient information to establish probable cause against
many of these targets and the United States would lose a significant amount of
critical intelligence because it extended privacy protections to non-United States
persons that were never intended for their protection. Even if the Intelligence
Community could establish probable cause against some of these targets, the
Intelligence Community would need to expend significant resources to meet this
high standard, and such resource expenditure would take away from other
critical national security missions and the entire process would cause delays in
collection that could be harmful.58 The Intelligence Community would simply
not be able to maintain nearly the same level of intelligence collection without
Section 702.59
Further, Section 702 allows for collection to occur in a stable and safe
domestic environment. Under downstream collection, the communications “to”
and “from” a selector are even provided to the NSA in a manner that is highly
likely to yield intact copies of the entirety of the communications. 60 While
Executive Order 12333 authorizes the NSA to collect SIGINT abroad on nonUnited States persons and accounts for the vast majority of SIGINT collected
globally, collection under Executive Order 12333 is often accomplished in a
more difficult and less safe environment, and often results in obtaining packets
of communications instead of entire communications.61 Therefore, Section 702
provides a more precise, complete, and safe collection authority than Executive
Order 12333. Also, Section 702 collection occurs by the compelled assistance
of United States electronic communications service providers, which means that
the government does not have to risk exposing its sensitive sources and methods
to obtain such information, which it risks exposing under Executive Order 12333
collection.62 Finally, the PCLOB has found that
57. U.S. CONST. amend. IV; United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75
(1990).
58. See James Comey, Dir., Fed. Bureau of Investigation, Keynote Address at the Intelligence
Studies Project Conference: Intelligence in Defense of the Homeland (Mar. 23, 2017), in Strauss
Ctr. for Int’l Sec. & Law, UNIV. OF TEX. AT AUSTIN (Mar. 30, 2017), at 4:05, 7:29–8:05,
https://intelligencestudies.utexas.edu/events/item/560-isp-spring-conference (describing that FISA
Title I applications are lengthy documents and undergo significant internal oversight and external
judicial oversight).
59. Interview with Benjamin A. Powell, Former Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l
Intelligence, in D.C. (Feb. 12, 2018).
60. INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 4.
61. Exec. Order No. 12,333, 3 C.F.R. § 200 (1981), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,284,
68 Fed. Reg. 4075 (Jan. 28, 2003), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,355, 69 Fed. Reg. 53,593
(Sept. 1, 2004), as amended by Exec. Order No. 13,470, 73 Fed. Reg. 45,325 (Aug. 4, 2008); INGLIS
& KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 4; PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at
107.
62. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 107.
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acquiring communications with the compelled assistance of U.S.
companies allows service providers and the government to manage the
manner in which the collection occurs. By helping to prevent
incidents of overcollection and swiftly remedy problems that do occur,
this arrangement can benefit the privacy of people whose
communications are at risk of being acquired mistakenly.63
II. TECHNOLOGICAL DEVELOPMENTS THAT COULD CHANGE HOW THE
UNITED STATES CONDUCTS SIGINT
Section 702 was a critical intelligence collection reform that belatedly
addressed technological developments to enable the Intelligence Community to
acquire important foreign intelligence to protect United States national security
interests and inform policymakers. While the collection programs under Section
702 have produced a great deal of valuable intelligence over the last decade, the
United States must begin to think about foreseeable technological developments
and strategically consider how to conduct SIGINT collection in the future.
Individuals now have access to sophisticated technologies that formerly only
governments seemed capable of creating. This decentralization of capabilities
is a trend that will likely only increase in the future. While access to new
technologies produces innovation, improves daily life, and aides human rights
activists living under oppressive regimes, these same technologies can be
utilized by malign actors to conduct illicit activities. 64 Two trends that may
benefit individual users while creating difficulties for the United States
Intelligence Community are the increased prevalence of anonymity and
location-spoofing technologies.
Also, the United States’ home field advantage is shrinking. 65 This trend
means that the United States will have a smaller share of the world’s
communications traffic transit its physical infrastructure, which will reduce the
Intelligence Community’s ability to acquire precise and intact communications
by serving directives on United States companies.66 The possible balkanization
of the Internet through data localization laws may exacerbate this trend
threatening the United States’ home field advantage.
Further, technology companies have begun to innovate in a manner that
reduces their capability to respond to lawful orders. Technology companies
have increasingly adopted encryption technologies and may shift data overseas
63. Id.
64. See BENJAMIN WITTES & GABRIELLA BLUM, THE FUTURE OF VIOLENCE 20 (2015) (“By
delivering dramatic new capabilities to humanity in general—and to individual humans in
particular—technological developments creates the certainty that some of those individuals will
use those capabilities to do evil.”).
65. David S. Kris, Trends and Predictions in Foreign Intelligence Surveillance: The FAA and
Beyond, 8 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 377, 417 (2016).
66. Id.; PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 107.

Fall 2019]Adapting U.S. Electronic Surveillance Laws, Policies, and Practices 67

to try to avoid complying with lawful surveillance orders in the United States.67
Following Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures regarding United States
intelligence activities, United States based technology companies have viewed
it as being in their interest to take more adversarial stances in their relationships
with the United States government to protect market share and maintain
consumer confidence, especially among foreign consumers. 68 Decisions by
major private sector technology companies, who may view themselves primarily
as global enterprises and may not necessarily be predisposed to serve the United
States government’s interests, have the remarkable ability to shape how SIGINT
is collected.
A.

Anonymity Technologies

The increased prevalence and advancement of anonymity technologies may
create difficulties for the Intelligence Community in its foreignness
determinations and post-tasking analysis. Anonymity tools intentionally hide
users’ real identities and locations, and provide individuals with ways to
circumvent censorship.69 These products can be enormously useful to human
rights activists, dissidents, and journalists living under oppressive regimes, as
well as provide privacy protections for individuals. 70 At the same time, the
information about a user’s true identity and location that are masked by
anonymity tools can be critical for the NSA’s ability to lawfully target
individuals under Section 702.
Tor is one of the most prominent anonymity technologies and serves as a good
example for understanding how these technologies operate. Tor enables users
to access the Internet anonymously and browse the Internet in such a way that the
computer the user is ultimately communicating with does not know who the user
is or where the user is physically located—the user’s Internet traffic instead
appears to originate from the Tor server.71 Individuals connect to Tor and the
packets of data that travel from the user’s computer to the recipient computer
travel an encrypted path through relay nodes.72 Relay nodes are computers that
are scattered across the world whose owners have also installed Tor and

67. Alan Z. Rozenshtein, Surveillance Intermediaries, 70 STAN. L. REV. 99, 134–35, 138
(2018).
68. Rozenshtein, supra note 67, at 115–16.
69. Jim Finkle, Web Tools Help Protect Human Rights Activists, REUTERS (Aug. 19, 2009,
4:33 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-column-pluggedin/web-tools-help-protect-humanrights-activists-idUSTRE57I4IE20090819.
70. David D. Clark & Susan Landau, Untangling Attribution, 2 HARV. NAT’L SEC. J. 531,
546 (2011); Finkle, supra note 69; Who Uses Tor?, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/
about/torusers.html.en (last visited Sept. 7, 2019).
71. Tor: Overview, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/about/overview.html.en (last visited
Sept. 8, 2019).
72. Id.
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volunteered their computers to serve as proxies that route data packets.73 Users
connecting to Tor randomly select a path of Tor nodes to perform
communications.74 When the user sends their message over the Tor network, the
message first travels to an entry node over an encrypted link.75 The entry node
only knows that the user is connecting to that entry node and that the user has a
message that the entry node must pass along to the middle node, but the entry
node does not know the content of the message or the message’s final recipient
because this information is encrypted. 76 Next, the middle node receives the
message from the entry node, but only knows that the message came from the
entry node and that it must pass the message to the exit node.77 The middle node
does not know who the message originated with, the message’s final recipient, or
the content of the message because this information is encrypted. 78
Subsequently, the exit node receives the message from the middle node, but only
knows that the message came from the middle node and that it must pass the
message to the recipient. 79 The exit node does not know who the message
originated with or the content of the message—as long as the connection
between the exit node and ultimate recipient is also encrypted.80 Finally, the
recipient receives the message from the exit node and can decrypt the content of
the message.81 This means that the user’s Internet traffic appears to originate
from the exit node, which is a proxy computer, rather than from the original
user’s computer.82 This hides the user’s IP address, which is a unique identifier
that identifies the user’s computer and can be used with a high degree of
accuracy to determine the location of the user.83 Also, the traffic emanating
from the user’s computer appears to be going only to the entry node—a proxy
computer—rather than the actual final destination from the perspective of the
Internet service provider (ISP).84 Tor updates its circuits frequently so the user
connects to different entry nodes and different exit nodes send the Internet traffic
to its final destination.85
73. What is Tor?, TOR, https://www.eff.org/torchallenge/what-is-tor.html (last visited Sept.
8, 2019).
74. Tor: Overview, supra note 71.
75. Id.
76. Id.
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Ahmed Ghappour, Searching Places Unknown: Law Enforcement Jurisdiction on the
Dark Web, 69 STAN. L. REV. 1075, 1091 (2017).
84. Id. at 1088.
85. Tor
FAQ:
How
Often
Does
Tor
Change
its
Paths?,
TOR,
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#ChangePaths (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (“Tor will
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An individual that is located in the United States and using an anonymity
technology, such as Tor, will appear to be located in another country from the
perspective of the destination computer—which is likely a webpage—if the exit
node is located in another country. Similarly, an individual using this
technology that is located outside of the United States will appear to be located
inside the United States from the perspective of the destination computer if the
exit node is located inside the United States. An individual will appear to the
ISP to be communicating only with the entry node and the ISP will not know
that the individual ultimately communicated with the destination computer.
Further, individuals can “host content or services without exposing the
physical location of their servers” by using Tor’s onion services, which were
formerly known as hidden services.86 Onion services are only accessible on the
Tor network and users can only communicate with an onion service through a
rendezvous point on the Tor network.87
Anonymity technologies have become more prevalent in recent years. The
number of Tor users increased from under one million users prior to the
Snowden disclosures to nearly six million users just after the disclosures, and is
currently about two million users as of March 2020.88 In 2014, a survey of
Internet users across twenty-four countries conducted by the Centre for
International Governance Innovation showed that 60% of Internet users had
heard about Edward Snowden and that 39% of those aware of Snowden reported
taking steps to protect their security and privacy online as a result of the
disclosures.89 Bruce Schneier, an American security technologist, calculated that
the data from this survey indicated that over 700 million people across the world
may have taken steps to try to improve their security and privacy online in the
aftermath of the Snowden disclosures.90 Many of these people are likely not
sophisticated technology users, but this demonstrates that there is growing
awareness of the surveillance activities that intelligence services engage in, and
there is a significant segment of the global population that desires greater
reuse the same circuit for new TCP streams for 10 minutes, as long as the circuit is working fine.
(If the circuit fails, Tor will switch to a new circuit immediately.)”).
86. Ghappour, supra note 83, at 1088; see also Tor: Onion Service Protocol, TOR,
https://www.torproject.org/docs/onion-services.html.en (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (explaining
onion services).
87. Tor: Onion Service Protocol, supra note 86.
88. Users, TOR METRICS, https://metrics.torproject.org/userstats-relay-country.html?start=
2013-06-01&end=2020-03-30&country=all&events=off (last visited Mar. 30, 2020) (showing user
data for Tor between June 1, 2013 and March 30, 2020).
89. CTR. FOR INT’L GOVERNANCE INNOVATION & IPSOS, 2014 CIGI-IPSOS GLOBAL SURVEY
ON INTERNET SECURITY AND TRUST 3 (2014), https://www.cigionline.org/sites/default/
files/documents/internet-survey-2014-factum.pdf.
90. Bruce Schneier, Over 700 Million People Taking Steps to Avoid NSA Surveillance,
LAWFARE (Dec. 15, 2014, 9:02 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/over-700-million-peopletaking-steps-avoid-nsa-surveillance.
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protections against such activities. People’s desire for greater security and
privacy online is likely also driven by the increased awareness of the extent of
information that private companies collect about users to use for advertising
purposes and the increased awareness of cybercrime. 91 This may drive more
people to use anonymity technologies, at least for sensitive online activities.
Also, malicious actors, such as terrorist organizations, have learned from the
Snowden disclosures and adjusted their tradecraft to attempt to thwart United
States intelligence.92 Guidelines for how to use Tor have been distributed on an
al-Qaeda affiliated forum, the Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham (ISIS) has
advised its followers to use Tor when engaging in propaganda activities and
communicating with other terrorists, and ISIS has reportedly launched
propaganda sites using Tor’s onion services.93
91. See Rafi Goldberg, Lack of Trust in Internet Privacy and Security May Deter Economic
and Other Online Activities, NAT’L TELECOMMS. & INFO. ADMIN. (May 13, 2016),
https://www.ntia.doc.gov/blog/2016/lack-trust-internet-privacy-and-security-may-detereconomic-and-other-online-activities (finding that Americans have become increasingly concerned
about Internet security and privacy because of prominent data breaches, cybersecurity incidents,
and privacy controversies); Mary Madden, Public Perceptions of Privacy and Security in the PostSnowden Era, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.pewinternet.org/
2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/ (finding that “91% of adults in the survey ‘agree’ or
‘strongly agree’ that consumers have lost control over how personal information is collected and
used by companies,” “80% of those who use social networking sites say they are concerned about
third parties like advertisers or businesses accessing the data they share on these sites,” and “[m]ost
say they want to do more to protect their privacy”).
92. See EDWARD JAY EPSTEIN, HOW AMERICA LOST ITS SECRETS: EDWARD SNOWDEN, THE
MAN AND THE THEFT 291–98 (2017) (recounting United States intelligence officials’
determinations that foreign terrorist targets took steps to avoid NSA SIGINT collection following
the Snowden revelations, which led to the NSA losing their ability to collect on these targets);
MICHAEL V. HAYDEN, PLAYING TO THE EDGE: AMERICAN INTELLIGENCE IN THE AGE OF TERROR
421 (2016) (stating that intelligence targets were alerted to United States intelligence tactics and
techniques by the Snowden disclosures); MICHAEL MORELL, THE GREAT WAR OF OUR TIME 294
(2015) (“Within weeks of the leaks, terrorist organizations around the world were already starting
to modify their actions in light of what Snowden disclosed. Communication sources dried up,
tactics were changed. Terrorists moved to more secure communication platforms, they are using
encryption, and they are avoiding electronic communications altogether.”).
93. See LAITH ALKHOURI & ALEX KASSIRER, TECH FOR JIHAD: DISSECTING JIHADISTS’
DIGITAL
TOOLBOX
2–3
(2016),
https://www.flashpoint-intel.com/wpcontent/uploads/2016/08/TechForJihad.pdf (finding that jihadists have sought to leverage Tor
and VPNs to improve their internet security and hide from intelligence and law enforcement
agencies, and have encouraged fellow terrorists to adopt these technologies on jihadist web
forums); JAMIE BARTLETT & ALEX KRASODOMSKI-JONES, ONLINE ANONYMITY: ISLAMIC STATE
AND
SURVEILLANCE
7–13
(2015),
https://www.demos.co.uk/files/islamic_State_and
_Encryption.pdf?1426713922 (providing a blog post that was likely posted by an ISIS fighter
advising terrorists on how to avoid government surveillance by using technologies such as Tor and
VPNs); Joseph Cox, ISIS Now Has a Propaganda Site on the Dark Web, MOTHERBOARD (Nov. 16,
2015, 2:20 PM), https://motherboard.vice.com/en_us/article/d7yzy7/isis-now-has-a-propagandasite-on-the-dark-web (finding that ISIS launched a propaganda website as a Tor hidden service,
which is now called an onion service); Tor Security Guidelines Distributed on AQ-Affiliated Forum,
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Anonymity technologies may present difficulties for the NSA in conducting
surveillance under Section 702 because the statute only permits the NSA to
target non-United States persons that are reasonably believed to be overseas.
Anonymity technologies disguise users’ true IP addresses, which are critical
pieces of information that can be used to identify individual’s locations. The
NSA may therefore have difficulty in determining whether a potential target is
a United States person or non-United States person and whether the potential
target is inside the United States or overseas. There will likely be many
occasions when the information that leads analysts to determine that there is a
valid foreign intelligence reason to target a person includes information about
the person’s citizenship and location, which would alleviate the difficulties
arising from having to make a foreignness determination based solely on
information that is transmitted using anonymity technologies, but this may not
always be the case.
For example, targeting may be based on an intelligence officer’s interaction
with a person on a terrorist chat forum.94 The person’s presence and activities
in the chat forum may provide the officer with a reasonable belief that the
individual “is expected to possess, receive, and/or is likely to communicate
foreign intelligence information.”95 The officer can then analyze the available
information regarding the potential target, such as, the language they use and
time of day that they log onto the chat forum, as indicators of the person’s status
and location.96 The officer may also review information in the NSA’s databases
to see if information regarding the person’s location is already known. 97
Sophisticated actors could use anonymity technologies and employ tradecraft
techniques to attempt to hide their identities and locations, which could require
NSA analysts to devote significant time and resources to determining whether
specific users are legitimate targets under Section 702.
Currently, the NSA is allowed “to make reasonable presumptions regarding a
target’s foreignness” based on the information that is available. 98 The NSA

SITE INTELLIGENCE GRP. (Dec. 1, 2015), https://news.siteintelgroup.com/Jihadist-News/torsecurity-guidelines-distributed-on-aq-affiliated-forum.html (determining that a group distributed a
manual on an al-Qaeda affiliated web forum for obtaining anonymity by using Tor); Kim Zetter,
Security Manual Reveals the OPSEC Advice ISIS Gives Recruits, WIRED (Nov. 19, 2015, 4:45 PM),
https://www.wired.com/2015/11/isis-opsec-encryption-manuals-reveal-terrorist-group-securityprotocols/ (analyzing an ISIS operational security guide that advises followers on how to protect
their communications and location data).
94. Interview with Matt Tait, Cybersecurity Senior Fellow, Robert S. Strauss Ctr. for Int’l
Sec. & Law, in Austin, Tex. (Feb. 8, 2018).
95. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 4.
96. Interview with Matt Tait, supra note 94.
97. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 3.
98. OFFICE OF THE DIR. OF NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, 2015 SUMMARY OF NOTABLE SECTION
702
REQUIREMENTS
4
(2015),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/icotr/51117/
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likely makes the presumption that an individual whose actual location cannot be
determined is outside the United States and assumes that a person whose location
is unknown is a non-United States person unless that person can be positively
identified as a United States person “or the nature or circumstances of the
person’s communications give rise to a reasonable belief that such person is a
United States person.”99 The FISC has noted that the NSA only makes such
presumptions of foreignness after it has exercised due diligence in attempting to
determine the potential target’s location.100
These presumptions are consistent with the statute’s requirement that the
Attorney General and DNI
adopt targeting procedures that are reasonably designed to–
(A) ensure that any acquisition authorized under [Section
702] is limited to targeting persons reasonably believed to
be located outside the United States; and
(B) prevent the intentional acquisition of any
communication as to which the sender and all intended
recipients are known at the time of the acquisition to be
located in the United States.101
When the NSA cannot determine the location of a potential target, such as when
a user consistently uses anonymity technologies, after exercising due diligence
then it is reasonable to assume that the person is not inside the United States, as
there is no information that indicates the person is inside the United States. Also,
the NSA would clearly not be intentionally acquiring communications to or from
a person known at the time of acquisition to be located in the United States as
the NSA would not know the person’s location at the time of acquisition.
The NSA’s presumptions are also consistent with the Fourth Amendment.
The Fourth Amendment asserts that:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be
violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place
to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.102
The Supreme Court has recognized that the warrant clause does not apply in
certain circumstances “when special needs, beyond the normal need for law
Doc%201%20%E2%80%93%202015%20Summary%20of%20Notable%20Section%20702%20
Requirements.pdf.
99. NSA, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES 2018, supra note 52, at 4.
100. In re DNI/AG Certification, No. 702(i)-08-01, at 10 (FISA Ct. Sept. 4, 2008),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/0315/FISC%20Opinion%20September
%204%202008.pdf.
101. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(d)(1).
102. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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enforcement, make the warrant and probable-cause requirements
impracticable.” 103 The Supreme Court has not addressed whether a similar
exception applies for foreign intelligence surveillance. In Katz, 104 the Court
noted in a footnote that its decision requiring the authorization of a magistrate
based on a showing of probable cause prior to engaging in electronic
surveillance to satisfy the Fourth Amendment did not determine whether the
same analysis would extend to situations involving national security, which
would include intelligence surveillance.105 The Court continued to leave open
the question of whether the Fourth Amendment requires a warrant when
intelligence investigations concern foreign powers even when it determined that
domestic surveillance required appropriate prior warrant procedure in Keith.106
Foreign intelligence surveillance serves a purpose beyond traditional law
enforcement objectives and is a vital tool for protecting national security. The
Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is ‘obvious and unarguable’ that no
governmental interest is more compelling than the security of the Nation.”107 The
government’s interest is therefore particularly strong in the foreign intelligence
context. If the government was required to obtain a warrant prior to engaging in
foreign intelligence surveillance, the government would be hindered in its “ability
to collect time-sensitive information” and the government’s “vital national
security interests that are at stake” would be impeded.108 This has led multiple
federal appeals courts and the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review
(FISCR) to recognize that there is a foreign intelligence exception to the Fourth
Amendment’s warrant requirement.109 The government’s action must therefore
103. Vernonia Sch. Dist. 47J v. Acton, 515 U.S. 646, 653 (1995) (quoting Griffin v. Wisconsin,
483 U.S. 868, 873 (1987)).
104. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
105. Id. at 358 n.23; see Eric Manpearl & Raheem Chaudhry, Judicial Oversight of the
Intelligence Community, in INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 71,
71 (2016).
106. United States v. U.S. Dist. Court (Keith), 407 U.S. 297 (1972).
107. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S. 500,
509 (1964)).
108. In re Directives Pursuant to Section 105b of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, 551
F.3d 1004, 1011 (FISA Ct. Rev. 2008).
109. Id.; United States v. Truong Dinh Hung, 629 F.2d 908, 912–16 (4th Cir. 1980); United
States v. Buck, 548 F.2d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 1977); United States v. Butenko, 494 F.2d 593, 604–06
(3d Cir. 1974) (en banc); United States v. Brown, 484 F.2d 418, 426 (5th Cir. 1973). But see
Zweibon v. Mitchell, 516 F.2d 594, 632–51 (D.C. Cir. 1975) (en banc) (plurality opinion)
(suggesting, in dictum, that no such exception exists, which was not joined by the majority of the
court). Subsequently, the D.C. Circuit has recognized that Zweibon only determined that “the
warrantless electronic surveillance within the United States of persons not suspected of any
collaboration with foreign interests adverse to this country violates the [F]ourth [A]mendment,”
but that “there was no opinion of the court on the question of warrantless surveillance of
collaborators or suspected collaborators of foreign interests.” Halkin v. Helms, 690 F.2d 977, 1000
n.82 (D.C. Cir. 1982); see also Ellsberg v. Mitchell, 709 F.2d 51, 66 n.63 (D.C. Cir. 1983); United
States v. Belfield, 692 F.2d 141, 145 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Chagnon v. Bell, 642 F.2d 1248, 1259 (D.C.
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comply with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement to be
constitutional.
In determining whether a government action is reasonable, courts must
consider the totality of the circumstances.110 Courts “weigh ‘the promotion of
legitimate governmental interests’ against ‘the degree to which [the search]
intrudes upon an individual’s privacy.’” 111 The government’s action is
reasonable in the situation where the NSA discovers a potential target that an
analyst determines “is expected to possess, receive, and/or is likely to
communicate foreign intelligence information concerning a foreign power or
foreign territory,” and that potential target is using an anonymity technology like
Tor to successfully mask their identity and physical location.112 The government
clearly has an extraordinarily strong interest in collecting foreign intelligence
information and the NSA has assessed that surveilling the potential target would
likely result in the acquisition of foreign intelligence in this situation. The NSA
only makes a presumptions of foreignness after it has exercised due diligence in
attempting to determine the potential target’s location. 113 Under VerdugoUrquidez,114 the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the searches of foreigners
outside the United States.115 Thus, an individual presumed to be a non-United
States person overseas does not have privacy interests protected by the Fourth
Amendment. However, the individual does suffer a severe privacy intrusion that
is protected under the Fourth Amendment if the individual is actually a United
States person or is located inside the United States. The NSA’s Section 702
procedures provide important protections that reduce this intrusiveness. If the
NSA discovers that this person was actually inside the United States or was
actually a United States person after targeting, the NSA must promptly detask
the selectors used by the individual, which terminates the acquisition directed at
those selectors.116 The data acquired from these selectors would be promptly
destroyed, too, unless the Director of the NSA made a specific determination
that an exception applied. 117 These measures provide back-end privacy
protections for United States persons or individuals that are actually located
Cir. 1980). While Truong stated that the “government should be relieved of seeking a warrant only
when the object of the search or the surveillance is a foreign power, its agent or collaborators,”
courts today would likely expand the foreign intelligence exception beyond this narrow foreign
power nexus requirement to foreign intelligence more broadly given the diverse array of threats
from both state and non-state actors in the modern world. Truong, 629 F.2d at 915.
110. Samson v. California, 547 U.S. 843, 848 (2006).
111. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 300 (1999)).
112. See NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 4.
113. In re DNI/AG Certification, supra note 100, at 10.
114. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
115. Id. at 274–75.
116. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 9–10.
117. NSA, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES 2018, supra note 52, at 8, 10–12.
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inside the United States that are presumed to be foreigners and targeted based
on their actions warranting a foreign intelligence purpose determination that
occur over the Tor network. The NSA’s actions are ultimately reasonable and
therefore constitutional in such a circumstance.
The real difficulty for the NSA may be in the post-tasking analysis, rather than
in targeting. The NSA requires that analysts review information for indications
that a target is a United States person, has entered the United States, or intends
to enter the United States.118 When a target uses anonymity technologies like
Tor, the target may appear to be located in different locations depending on
where the nodes are located at any given time.119 There may be instances where
the communications acquired from an electronic communications service
provider under downstream or Internet transactions acquired from companies that
operate the “the telecommunications ‘backbone’ over which telephone and
Internet communications transit” under upstream indicate that the target is located
inside the United States if the Tor nodes are located inside the United States.120
NSA analysts must determine if such information indicates that the target is
actually a United States person or is actually inside the United States, which
would require detasking, or if the target is only appearing to be present inside the
United States because they are using an anonymity technology.121 This may be
a resource intensive endeavor for NSA analysts that leads analysts to spend
valuable time trying to determine if the target can continue to be lawfully targeted
under Section 702. This would inevitably reduce the amount of time that analysts
could spend on other important national security matters. The post-tasking
analysis may result in detasking selectors that appear to be being used by a target
inside the United States. While the NSA may notify the FBI that a target has
appeared to enter the United States so that the FBI may seek a traditional FISA
Title I order or take other lawful investigative steps, there may not be enough
information to meet the higher legal standards to proceed with these other
investigative measures.122
Although the NSA must have determined the person was “expected to
possess, receive, and/or is likely to communicate foreign intelligence
information concerning a foreign power or foreign territory”123 in order to target
them under Section 702, there may not be enough information to establish
118. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 6–8.
119. See supra Part II.A.
120. See PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 7 (explaining how
PRISM collection, now called downstream collection, and upstream collection operate).
121. See NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 8–10 (explaining that the
NSA must promptly detask the selectors used by an individual if the NSA determines that the
individual that was reasonably believed to be located outside the United States was actually inside
the United States after targeting, or if the NSA determines that the individual that was believed to
be a non-United States person was actually a United States person after targeting).
122. NSA, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES 2018, supra note 52, at 12.
123. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 4.
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probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power to obtain a FISA
Title I order, or “probable cause for belief that an individual is committing, has
committed, or is about to commit” an enumerated crime to obtain a court order
to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications under Title III of the
Omnibus Crime and Safe Streets Act of 1968. 124 This means that the
Intelligence Community would lose the ability to collect on the target, and
therefore lose potentially important insight into a terrorist group, foreign
country, or other illicit actor. Even if there is enough information to obtain
probable cause under one of these legal mechanisms, it requires significant
resources and time to put together sufficient FISA Title I and Title III
applications.125
If anonymity tools become more prevalent and such post-tasking problems
become more common, this would pose a serious problem for the Intelligence
Community. Trying to establish probable cause on a significant number of
targets that appear to now be located within the United States after originally
appearing to be non-United States persons overseas when they were first
targeted would require the government to use a significant amount of resources,
which would take way from other important national security missions, and
cause delays in intelligence collection. In addition, even if it were later
discovered that the target was using an anonymity technology, such as Tor, and
not actually inside the United States, which would allow for the selector to be
tasked once again, any communications that occurred during the intervening
time after the selector was detasked and before the selector was re-tasked would
not be collected and would be lost to the Intelligence Community.
However, there is reason to doubt that anonymity technologies will become
widespread to the point where they may cause significant problems for the
NSA.126 Anonymity tools like Tor are not simple to use and will always be
rather slow because users’ traffic must bounce through volunteers’ proxy

124. Title III of the Omnibus Crime Control and Safe Streets Act of 1968, 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)
(2012); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (2012); see PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra
note 11, at 109 (discussing probable cause requirements under FISA Title I); NSA, MINIMIZATION
PROCEDURES 2018, supra note 52, at 12 (explaining that the NSA may notify the FBI that a target
has appeared to enter the United States so that the FBI may seek a traditional FISA Title I order or
take other lawful investigative steps).
125. See, e.g., OFFICE OF ENF’T OPERATIONS, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL 1–16
(2005),
https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal/legacy/2014/10/29/elec-sur-manual.pdf
(describing the Title III wiretap application process) [hereinafter OEO, ELECTRONIC
SURVEILLANCE MANUAL]; See also Roberts, supra note 17 (quoting former Director of National
Intelligence (DNI) Admiral Mike McConnell as stating “[i]t takes about 200 man hours to do [a
FISA application for] one telephone number”).
126. Telephone Interview with Nicholas Weaver, Researcher, Int’l Comput. Sci. Inst.,
Professor, Univ. of Cal. Berkley (Feb. 5, 2018) (explaining the performance costs of using Tor).
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computers in different parts of the world.127 There are also bottlenecks caused
by the network not having enough nodes, especially exit nodes, to handle all of
the traffic.128 Currently, people volunteer their computers to serve as nodes, but
this uses bandwidth and therefore costs these people money to provide a service
for others using the network.129 Middle nodes have no opportunity to see content
in anonymity technologies and therefore cannot even try to monetize access to
such information by selling it to advertisers as this would defeat the purpose of
anonymity technologies.130 It is difficult to see how a company would monetize
an anonymity technology product other than by having users pay for it, which
could generate revenue to pay for computers to serve as nodes. But many people
may not be willing to pay for such products.131 Also, it can be especially difficult
to get enough people to volunteer to run exit nodes.132 When illicit actors use Tor
to engage in criminal activity, like accessing child pornography websites, it is the
exit node’s IP address that appears to be connecting to the final website.133 This
means that the person running the exit node can get embroiled in criminal
investigations.134 This risk reduces the number of people that are willing to
serve as exit nodes, which exacerbates the bottleneck issue that is part of what
slows anonymity technologies. It is still possible that an Internet browser could
create an anonymity technology and could compete with other major Internet
browsers, such as Google Chrome and Mozilla Firefox, but it seems unlikely

127. Tor FAQ: Why is Tor so Slow?, TOR, https://www.torproject.org/
docs/faq.html.en#WhySlow (last visited Sept. 8, 2019); see also SUSAN LANDAU, SURVEILLANCE
OR SECURITY?: THE RISKS POSED BY NEW WIRETAPPING TECHNOLOGIES 199 (2010)
(acknowledging that Tor and other anonymity technologies “have high overhead and are not
expected to be used by the vast majority of users”).
128. See ROGER DINGLEDINE & STEVEN J. MURDOCH, PERFORMANCE IMPROVEMENTS ON
TOR OR, WHY TOR IS SLOW AND WHAT WE’RE GOING TO DO ABOUT IT 7–11 (2009),
https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/roadmaps/2009-03-11-performance.pdf (explaining traffic
in the Tor network and its capacity).
129. See Interview with Matt Tait, supra note 94.
130. Id.
131. See NIC NEWMAN ET AL., REUTERS INST., DIGITAL NEWS REPORT 2017 36 (2017),
https://reutersinstitute.politics.ox.ac.uk/sites/default/files/Digital%20News%20Report%202017%
20web_0.pdf (finding that video was the form of online media that had the highest proportion of
people that paid for it based on a study of 36 markets, and that only 23% of people across the 36
markets stated that they paid for this form of online media); Lee Rainie & Kristen Purcell, The
Economics
of
Online
News,
PEW
RESEARCH
CTR.
(Mar.
15,
2010),
http://www.pewinternet.org/2010/03/15/the-economics-of-online-news/ (finding that only about
one in five stated they would be willing to pay for online news content).
132. See DINGLEDINE & MURDOCH, supra note 128, at 7–11; Interview with Matt Tait, supra
note 94.
133. See Tor FAQ: How is Tor Different from Other Proxies?, TOR,
https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#Torisdifferent (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
134. Id.
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that anonymity technologies will become as ubiquitous as encryption
technologies have become.135
Further, people often reveal information about themselves even when using
anonymity technologies.136 People have a natural desire to want to be connected
with others and therefore often use social media and email, which can provide
information regarding a person’s true identity and location.137 Many people do
not necessarily want to remain anonymous all the time.138
Nonetheless, these technologies can still currently pose problems for the NSA
and the increased prevalence of anonymity technologies will likely make the
NSA’s work more difficult, especially with malign actors who use sophisticated
tradecraft. Also, these bad actors will become more difficult to surveil as other
innocent users decide to use anonymity technologies because this enables the
malicious actors to hide among innocent users.
B.

Location-Spoofing Technologies

The increased prevalence of location-spoofing technologies, such as virtual
private networks (VPNs), may create more severe difficulties for the NSA than
anonymity technologies. VPNs encrypt and relay Internet communications from
a user’s computer to another computer, where the communications are then
decrypted and sent on to their final destination.139 This makes it appear as if the
communications are actually coming from the intermediary computer, which can
be run by a VPN service, instead of the original user. 140 Thus, “the user’s
apparent IP address corresponds to the VPN server, which may or may not be in
the same country as the user.”141 VPNs are used by businesses so that employees
can securely access internal resources; by ordinary people to protect their
privacy and protect their personal data from being stolen by cyber criminals; and
to defeat censorship through geo-blocking, which is a location-based restriction
135. See Stephen Shankland, Want True Privacy, You Need to Check Out This Browser, CNET
(Apr. 6, 2017, 5:00 AM), https://www.cnet.com/news/privacy-browser-brave-tor-trump/
(describing a new web browser, Brave, that is using Tor’s anonymizing technology for its “private
browsing” mode).
136. See Interview with Benjamin A. Powell, supra note 59.
137. See, e.g., Roy F. Baumeister & Mark R. Leary, The Need to Belong: Desire for
Interpersonal Attachments as a Fundamental Human Motivation, 117 PSYCHOL. BULL. 497, 522
(1995) (concluding that human beings have a strong desire for interpersonal attachments).
138. See id. at 520–21 (finding strong evidence of human desire to form social attachments,
and that lack of belonging led to negative effects).
139. JAMES A. LEWIS ET AL., THE EFFECT OF ENCRYPTION ON LAWFUL ACCESS TO
COMMUNICATIONS AND DATA 11 (2017), https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/
files/what-we-do/policies/organized-crime-and-human-trafficking/encryption/csis_study_en.pdf;
Surveillance Self-Defense, VPN, https://ssd.eff.org/en/glossary/vpn (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
140. See Tor FAQ: How is Tor Different from Other Proxies?, supra note 133; Surveillance
Self-Defense, supra note 139.
141. Kris, supra note 65, at 413.
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on the access to certain Internet content that depends on IP addresses to filter
users.142
Location-spoofing technologies like VPNs are much more common than
anonymity technologies and are becoming more widely adopted. VPNs are
more user-friendly than anonymity technologies and we may very well see a
trend in the adoption of VPNs that mirrors the adoption of encryption
technologies, which have increasingly become the default on many devices.143
In the fourth quarter of 2016, a Global Web Index survey found that 30% of
global Internet users stated that they used a VPN or proxy server when accessing
the Internet, which was an increase from a Global Web Index survey in the first
quarter of 2016 that found that nearly 25% of global Internet users stated that
they used a VPN or proxy server when accessing the Internet.144 A 2015 Global
Web Index survey also found that 70% of VPN users reported using VPNs at
least once a week.145 The worldwide VPN market was expected to grow from
$45 billion in 2014 to $70 billion in 2019. 146 This indicates that VPNs are
becoming increasingly popular.147
Adversaries may specifically use location-spoofing technologies to hide their
true locations. ISIS and al-Qaeda have advised their followers to use VPNs, and
have even published detailed manuals to educate their followers about location142. See id.; Max Eddy, The Best VPN Services of 2019, PC MAGAZINE (Sept. 10, 2019, 11:25
AM), https://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,2403388,00.asp; Surveillance Self-Defense, supra
note 139.
143. See Eric Manpearl, Preventing “Going Dark”: A Sober Analysis and Reasonable Solution
to Preserve Security in the Encryption Debate, 28 U. FLA. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 65, 72–73 (2017)
(discussing the trend of widespread encryption adoption); 4 Reasons Behind VPN Apps Rising
Popularity Among Mobile Users, PC NEWS (July 27, 2016), http://www.pc-os.org/4-reasonsbehind-vpn-apps-rising-popularity-among-mobile-users/; Telephone Interview with Michael
Daniel, Former Special Assistant to the President & Cybersecurity Coordinator, White House (Feb.
6, 2018) (expecting VPNs to become widely used in the future); Telephone Interview with David
S. Kris, Assistant Attorney Gen. for Nat’l Security, U.S. Dep’t of Justice (Feb. 6, 2018)
(highlighting the increased prevalence of VPNs); Telephone Interview with Nicholas Weaver,
supra note 126 (acknowledging that VPNs are much more likely to be used than Tor).
144. Chase Buckle, Turkey Leads for VPN Usage, GLOB. WEB INDEX (Jan. 10, 2017),
https://blog.globalwebindex.net/chart-of-the-day/turkey-leads-for-vpn-usage/; see also Number of
VPN Users in Selected Global Markets as of 2nd Quarter 2014 (in Millions), STATISTA (Sept. 17,
2014), https://www.statista.com/statistics/324982/vpn-users-countries/ (showing the number of
VPN users as of the second quarter of 2014 in China, India, Brazil, Indonesia, Mexico, Vietnam,
Argentina, Turkey, Thailand, and Saudi Arabia).
145. Katie Young, 1 in 4 VPN Users Accessing Daily, GLOB. WEB INDEX (Feb. 17, 2016),
https://blog.globalwebindex.net/chart-of-the-day/1-in-4-vpn-users-accessing-daily/.
146. Size of the Virtual Private Network (VPN) Market Worldwide by Type in 2014 and 2019
(in Billion U.S. Dollars), STATISTA (Oct. 15, 2015), https://www.statista.com/statistics/
542797/worldwide-virtual-private-network-market-by-type/.
147. See Thorin Klosowski, Why is Everyone Talking About VPNs?, LIFEHACKER (Mar. 29,
2017, 1:09 PM), https://lifehacker.com/why-is-everyone-talking-about-vpns-1793768312
(discussing the increased interest in VPNs).
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spoofing technologies and encourage their followers to use VPNs. 148 Also,
Russian actors working for the Internet Research Agency that engaged in active
measures to meddle in United States politics and the 2016 presidential election
“purchased space on computer servers located inside the United States in order
to set up virtual private networks (‘VPNs’)” to make it appear as though they
were located inside the United States to carry out their activities and influence
operations.149 These Russian actors “connected from Russia to the U.S.-based
infrastructure by way of these VPNs and conducted activity inside the United
States—including accessing online social media accounts, opening new
accounts, and communicating with real U.S. persons—while masking the
Russian origin and control of the activity.”150
By masking the true location of the user, location-spoofing technologies like
VPNs may hinder the NSA’s ability to efficiently conduct SIGINT collection
under Section 702 because location-spoofing technologies may cause problems
for the NSA in making pre-tasking foreignness determinations and in conducting
post-tasking analysis regarding an individual’s location. These problems would
be greatly exacerbated by the widespread adoption of location-spoofing
technologies like VPNs.
Under Section 702, the NSA may only target non-United States persons that
are reasonably believed to be outside the United States.151 A potential target
may consistently use VPN services that are located inside the United States. The
potential target’s IP address would appear to be the VPN server’s IP address and
indicate that the potential target was located wherever the VPN server is, instead
of revealing the potential target’s true IP address and actual location. If the VPN
server is inside the United States, then the potential target will appear to be
located inside the United States even if the potential target is really overseas. As
discussed supra,152 there will likely be many occasions when the information
that leads analysts to determine that there is a valid foreign intelligence reason
to target a person includes information about the person’s citizenship and
location, which would alleviate the difficulties arising from having to make a
foreignness determination based solely on information that is transmitted using
location-spoofing technologies, but this may not always be the case. The foreign
intelligence purpose determination may not be based on the type of information
148. See ALKHOURI & KASSIRER, supra note 93, at 2–3 (finding that jihadists have sought to
leverage Tor and VPNs to improve their Internet security and hide from intelligence and law
enforcement agencies, and have encouraged fellow terrorists to adopt these technologies on jihadist
web forums); BARTLETT & KRASODOMSKI-JONES, supra note 93, at 7–12; Zetter, supra note 93
(analyzing an ISIS operational security guide that advised followers on how to protect their
communications and location data).
149. Indictment at para. 39, United States v. Internet Research Agency L.L.C., Case No. 1:18cr-00032-DLF (D.D.C. Feb. 16, 2018), https://www.justice.gov/file/1035477/download.
150. Id.
151. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a.
152. See supra Part II.
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that would allow analysts to make a foreignness determination from this
information, and the NSA may not have any prior information regarding a
potential new target in its databases to aid in the foreignness determination.153
Further, NSA analysts are required to “exercise a standard of due diligence” in
making the foreignness determination, and make “their determinations based on
the totality of the circumstances.”154 The PCLOB has confirmed
that this is not a “51% to 49% test.” If there is conflicting information
indicating whether a target is located in the United States or is a U.S.
person, that conflict must be resolved and the user must be determined
to be a non-U.S. person reasonably believed to be located outside the
United States prior to targeting.155
This means that NSA analysts must be able to find enough information
indicating that a potential target is actually located overseas to overcome the
indication from the IP address, which is truly the IP address of the VPN server,
that a potential target is located inside the United States based on the totality of
the circumstances. If a significant number of potential targets use locationspoofing technologies like VPNs as part of their tradecraft to try to avoid
surveillance, this could require NSA analysts to expend a great deal of effort to
uncover that a potential target is indeed located overseas. This would limit
analysts’ ability to engage in their other important intelligence work as
foreignness determinations would take longer, and would cause delays in
targeting, which means that there would be delays in the ability to actually
collect important intelligence on these targets.156 Delays in collection could
have severe consequences when trying to understand fast-moving and dynamic
threats, such as terrorist organizations.157 Also, this may lead to instances in

153. See NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 3.
154. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 117.
155. PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 44; see also PCLOB,
TRANSCRIPT OF PUBLIC HEARING, supra note 42, at 40–43 (explaining that there is not a 51% rule
and that the foreignness determination must be based on the totality of the circumstances); NAT’L
SEC. AGENCY, NSA DIRECTOR OF CIVIL LIBERTIES AND PRIVACY OFFICE REPORT: NSA’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE ACT SECTION 702 4 (2014),
https://www.nsa.gov/about/civilliberties/reports/assets/files/nsa_report_on_section_702_program.pdf
[hereinafter
NSA’S
IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA § 702]. When identifying and tasking a selector,
If the analyst discovers any information indicating the targeted person may be located in
the U.S. or that the target may be a U.S. person, such information must be considered.
In other words, if there is conflicting information about the location of the person or the
status of the person as a non-U.S. person, that conflict must be resolved before targeting
can occur.
NSA’S IMPLEMENTATION OF FISA § 702, at 4.
156. Kris, supra note 65, at 416.
157. See Frank J. Cilluffo & Daniel Rankin, Combating New Security Threats: Fighting
Terrorism, NATO REVIEW, https://www.nato.int/docu/review/2001/Combating-New-Security-
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which the NSA cannot resolve the conflict and adequately determine that the
potential target is reasonably believed to be outside the United States even
though in reality the potential target is a non-United States person overseas
because the potential target is using tradecraft to hide the person’s true identity
and location and using VPNs located inside the United States.158
Location-spoofing technologies may also cause especially significant
problems for the NSA in post-tasking analysis. NSA analysts must review
information to determine whether there is any indication that a target is a United
States person, has entered the United States, or intends to enter the United
States.159 When a target uses a VPN that is located inside the United States, the
target’s IP address may appear to be located inside the United States even if the
target remains overseas.160 If the NSA is heavily dependent on IP addresses to
determine location, the use of location-spoofing technologies like VPNs could
result in analysts having to spend significant amount of time trying to resolve
the conflicting information about the location of the target between the time the
person was first targeted and the current information acquired after the person
began using the VPN.161 This could create a major resource problem for the
NSA if there is widespread use of location-spoofing technologies like VPNs
given the scale of SIGINT collection under Section 702, which had more than
164,000 targets in 2018.162
Further, this could result in the NSA having to detask targets when analysts
cannot resolve the conflicting information and believe the target has entered the

Threats/Fighting-terrorism/EN/index.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2019) (describing the dynamic
nature of the threat from terrorism).
158. Cf. Interview with Carrie F. Cordero, Former Senior Assoc. Gen. Counsel, Office of the
Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, Former Counsel to the Assistant Att’y Gen. for Nat’l Sec., U.S. Dep’t of
Justice, in D.C. (Feb. 12, 2018) (stating that conflicting information regarding a potential target’s
location or United States person status may result from the use of technologies like VPNs, and that
there may be instances in which the NSA cannot resolve the conflict).
159. NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 6–8.
160. Kris, supra note 65, at 413.
161. See NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 2 (noting the NSA has
specifically used an Internet Protocol (IP) filter with at least upstream collection to limit acquisition
“to Internet transactions that originate and/or terminate outside the United States”); Kris, supra note
65, at 414; Interview with Benjamin Wittes, Senior Fellow, Brookings Inst., Co-Founder & Editorin-Chief, Lawfare, in D.C. (Feb. 13, 2018) (stating that there may be a problem for the NSA if a
target starts using a VPN for the first time after the person has already been targeted and is the subject
of ongoing collection after having been initially deemed to be reasonably believed to be outside the
United States because the VPN may make it look like the person has travelled from outside the
United States to inside the United States, which creates a burden on the NSA analyst to determine if
the person indeed entered the United States or not).
162. Kris, supra note 65, at 416; Interview with Benjamin Wittes, supra note 161; DNI,
TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2018, supra note 4, at 13; Telephone Interview with David S. Kris, supra
note 143.
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United States.163 In an increasingly globalized world where a growing number
of people travel and use mobile communications devices, it is quite believable
that a target could have entered the United States.164 As discussed supra,165
although the NSA may notify the FBI that a target has appeared to enter the
United States so that the FBI may seek a traditional FISA Title I order or take
other lawful investigative steps, there may not be enough information to
establish probable cause that the target is an agent of a foreign power to obtain
a FISA Title I order, or “probable cause for belief that an individual is
committing, has committed, or is about to commit” an enumerated crime to
obtain a court order to intercept wire, oral, and electronic communications under
Title III.166 This means that the Intelligence Community could lose the ability to
collect on the target. Even if there is enough information to obtain probable cause
under one of these legal mechanisms, it requires significant resources and time to
put together sufficient FISA Title I and Title III applications.167 Thus, trying to
establish probable cause on a significant number of targets that all of the sudden
appear to be located within the United States after originally appearing to be
overseas when they were first targeted would take way from other important
national security missions and cause delays in intelligence collection. Even
though the target may be re-tasked if the NSA develops a reasonable belief that
the person is outside the United States at a later point in time and the NSA
continues to believe that the person possesses or is likely to communicate foreign
intelligence information, there will be a gap in collection between the time the
target was detasked and re-tasked despite the fact that the person may have been a
legitimate target outside the United States the entire time.168
C. The Reduction in the United States’ Home Field Advantage
The United States’ home field advantage in conducting SIGINT collection is
diminishing. The Internet is rapidly expanding with more users and data being
163. Kris, supra note 65, at 414; see NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 37, at
2, 7 (noting the NSA has specifically used an IP filter with at least upstream collection to limit
acquisition “to Internet transactions that originate and/or terminate outside the United States” and
“[i]f the NSA determines that a target has entered the United States” then the NSA must terminate
acquisition from the target without delay).
164. Kris, supra note 65, at 414.
165. See supra Part I.C.
166. 18 U.S.C. § 2518(3)(a) (2012); 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a); NSA, MINIMIZATION PROCEDURES
2018, supra note 52, at 12; NSA, TARGETING PROCEDURES 2017, supra note 41, at 4; PCLOB,
REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 50.
167. See, e.g., OEO, ELECTRONIC SURVEILLANCE MANUAL, supra note 125, at 1–7
(describing the Title III wiretap application process); Roberts, supra note 17 (quoting former
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Admiral Mike McConnell as stating “[i]t takes about 200
man hours to do [a FISA application for] one telephone number”).
168. Interview with Carrie F. Cordero, supra note 158; Telephone Interview with David S.
Kris, supra note 143.
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transmitted.169 In August 2001, just before the September 11 terrorist attacks,
the Internet had 513 million users, which constituted 8.6% of the world’s
population.170 In December 2019, the Internet had about 4.574 billion users,
which constituted 58.7% of the world’s population.171 As Internet growth has
occurred, more transmission facilities have been built and are being planned,
such as Internet exchange points that transmit local Asian and European traffic
and undersea communications cables.172 For example, Brazil and the European
Union have agreed to lay an undersea cable for communications that would
connect South America directly to Europe, which would reduce reliance on
fiber-optic cables that transit the United States. 173 This agreement was
motivated at least in part by the desire to try to avoid U.S. SIGINT activities that
were revealed by Edward Snowden.174 It has been estimated that while 80% of
the world’s telecommunications traffic transited United States-based routers
prior to 2001, only about 20% of the world’s telecommunications traffic
transited the United States by 2010. 175 Regardless of whether this specific
estimate is accurate, there is a very real trend that a smaller share of the world’s
communications are transiting the United States, which reduces the United
States’ home field advantage and therefore diminishes the fruitfulness of
SIGINT acquired through the programs under Section 702.176
This trend may be exacerbated by a push for data localization laws. Numerous
countries have considered or enacted data localization rules “that limit the
storage, movement, and/or processing of data to specific geographies and

169. Kris, supra note 65, at 416.
170. Internet
Growth
Statistics,
INTERNET
WORLD
STATS,
https://www.internetworldstats.com/emarketing.htm (last visited Sept. 8, 2019).
171. Id.;
Internet
Usage
Statistics,
INTERNET
WORLD
STATS,
https://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm (last visited Mar. 30, 2020).
172. Chris Bryant, Spying Questions Emerge Over Frankfurt’s Data Hub, FIN. TIMES (July 4,
2013), https://www.ft.com/content/a3e573ce-e3fd-11e2-91a3-00144feabdc0; Jeff Hecht, The
Bandwidth Bottleneck that is Throttling the Internet, SCI. AM.: THE NATURE MAGAZINE (Aug. 10,
2016),
https://www.scientificamerican.com/article/the-bandwidth-bottleneck-that-is-throttlingthe-internet/; Kris, supra note 65, at 416; Ryan Singel, NSA’s Lucky Break: How the U.S. Became
Switchboard to the World, WIRED (Oct. 10, 2007, 2:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/207/10/nsaslucky-break-how-the-u-s-became-switchboard-to-the-world/.
173. Robin Emmott, Brazil, Europe Plan Undersea Cable to Skirt U.S. Spying, REUTERS (Feb.
24, 2014, 6:52 AM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-eu-brazil/brazil-europe-plan-underseacable-to-skirt-u-s-spying-idUSBREA1N0PL20140224; John Tibbles, Submarine Cables, Security
and the State, SUBMARINE TELECOMS FORUM, May 2017, at 23, 29.
174. Emmott, supra note 173; Spain, Brazil Plan Subsea Fiber Optic Cable by 2019, REUTERS
(Apr. 24, 2017, 8:02 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/spain-brazil-telecoms/spain-brazilplan-subsea-fiber-optic-cable-by-2019-idUSL1N1HW1VO.
175. Marc Ambinder, How the U.S. Lost its Home Field Surveillance Advantage, ATL. (Feb.
6, 2010), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/02/how-the-us-lost-its-home-fieldsurveillance-advantage/35495/.
176. Kris, supra note 65, at 417.
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jurisdictions, or [would] limit the companies that can manage data based upon
the company’s nation of incorporation or principal situs of operations and
management.”177 Some authoritarian governments, such as China and Russia,
have pursued data localization laws as a way to control the information that is
available to citizens and to monitor their citizens’ online activities.178 China
famously restricts access to certain websites and Internet services with the
“Great Firewall,” and limits cross-border data transfers.179 China has enacted
numerous laws and issued rules to store data regarding credit information,
personal information, health information, and business information locally;
require servers used for an array of publishing services such as “app stores, audio
and video distribution platforms, online literature databases, and online gaming”
to be located inside China; and try to exclude foreign technology firms from
offering cloud-computing services in China. 180 Russia has also enacted
requirements for the personal data of Russian citizens to be stored in databases
located inside of Russia, and for telecommunications providers and ISPs to store
the content and metadata of communications for specific periods of time within
Russia.181
Recently, democratic countries have also started to push for data localization.
Although officials in numerous countries have advocated for data localization
177. Jonah Force Hill, The Growth of Data Localization Post-Snowden: Analysis and
Recommendations for U.S. Policymakers and Industry Leaders, in 3 LAWFARE RESEARCH PAPER
SERIES 1, 3 (2014) (analyzing the recent data localization movement and the motivations behind
this trend); Myriam Gufflet, French Senate Proposes Data Localization, INT’L ASS’N OF PRIVACY
PROF’LS (May 12, 2016), https://iapp.org/news/a/french-senate-proposes-data-localization/
(discussing a proposal that was made in the French Senate in May 2016 to require personal data to
be stored in the European Union and to prohibit the transfer of personal data to a non-European
Union third country); Claire Cain Miller, Revelations of N.S.A. Spying Cost U.S. Tech Companies,
N.Y.
TIMES
(Mar.
21,
2014),
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/22/business/
fallout-from-snowden-hurting-bottom-line-of-tech-companies.html (reporting that Germany,
among other countries, has “consider[ed] legislation that would make it costly or even technically
impossible for American tech companies to operate inside their borders”); Sam Ball, Plans to Stop
U.S. Spying with European Internet, FRANCE24 (Feb. 18, 2014, 12:04 PM),
http://www.france24.com/en/20140217-european-internet-plans-nsa-spying (revealing that France
and Germany have discussed creating a European communications network to enable Europeans to
send and receive emails and other data without having the information pass through United States
networks and servers).
178. NIGEL CORY, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., CROSS-BORDER DATA FLOWS:
WHERE ARE THE BARRIERS, AND WHAT DO THEY COST? 21–22, 28 (May 2017)
http://www2.itif.org/2017-cross-border-dataflows.pdf?_ga=2.50788009.1438585138.1567354975-134080276.1567354975; Hill, supra note
177, at 3.
179. CORY, supra note 178, at 21–22.
180. Id.
181. Id. at 28; Ksenia Koroleva, “Yarovaya” Law–New Data Retention Obligations for
Telecom Providers and Arrangers in Russia, GLOB. PRIVACY & SEC. COMPLIANCE LAW BLOG
(July 29, 2016), https://www.globalprivacyblog.com/privacy/yarovaya-law-new-data-retentionobligations-for-telecom-providers-and-arrangers-in-russia/.
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by claiming that such policies would better protect privacy in the aftermath of
the Snowden disclosures, the trend towards data localization seems to be
primarily motivated by the desire “to protect domestic businesses from foreign
competition, [and] to support domestic intelligence and law enforcement
ambitions.”182 United States technology companies have dominated the global
market, and some European business leaders and politicians appear to have taken
advantage of the Snowden disclosures and public outcry to promote domestic
businesses and enable domestic technology companies to garner greater market
share to the detriment of United States companies by portraying United States
companies as untrustworthy because of their (lawful and compelled) cooperation
with the NSA.183
For example, shortly after the initial Snowden disclosures in summer 2013,
the German Interior Minister, Hans-Peter Friedrich, stated that “whoever fears
their communication is being intercepted in any way should use services that
don’t go through American servers.”184 In 2014, German Chancellor Angela
Merkel suggested that Europe should improve and develop its own Internet
infrastructure so that Germany could keep its data inside Europe instead of
having it transit the United States.185 Chancellor Merkel informed the German
public that she would work with other European leaders to “discuss which
European providers . . . offer security for our citizens . . . [s]o that you don’t
have to go across the Atlantic with emails and other things, but can build up
communications networks also within Europe.” 186 The German government
terminated its contract with Verizon in June 2014 and announced that it would
end all business with Verizon by 2015, largely as a result of Verizon having been
implicated in the NSA’s SIGINT collection activities. 187 A German
telecommunications company, Deutsche Telekom, then received the contract
182. Hill, supra note 177, at 22.
183. See Kristin Stoller, The World’s Largest Tech Companies 2017: Apple and Samsung
Lead, Facebook Rises, FORBES (May 24, 2017, 7:00 AM), https://www.forbes.com/
sites/kristinstoller/2017/05/24/the-worlds-largest-tech-companies-2017-apple-and-samsung-leadfacebook-rises/#e3425ead140d (showing that United States technology companies have become
the largest companies in the world and detailing the prominence of United States technology
products and services).
184. German Minister: Drop Google if You Fear US Spying, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT
(July 3, 2013), https://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2013/07/03/german-ministerdrop-google-if-you-fear-us-spying.
185. Alison Smale, Merkel Backs Return to Keep European Data in Europe, N.Y. TIMES (Feb.
16,
2014),
https://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/17/world/europe/merkel-backs-plan-to-keepeuropean-data-in-europe.html.
186. Id.
187. ADAM SEGAL, THE HACKED WORLD ORDER: HOW NATIONS FIGHT, TRADE,
MANEUVER, AND MANIPULATE IN THE DIGITAL AGE 155 (2016); Aaron Mamiit, German
Government Drops Verizon Contract in Fear of U.S. Espionage, TECH TIMES (June 27, 2014, 9:11
AM),
http://www.techtimes.com/articles/9292/20140627/german-government-drops-verizoncontract-in-fear-of-u-s-espionage.htm.
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that had been terminated with Verizon by the German government.188 Germany
also enacted legislation in 2016 to require telecommunications providers to
retain metadata for specific periods of time and store that metadata in servers
located in Germany to improve law enforcement effectiveness, but a German
regulator suspended enforcement of the data retention provisions in June 2017
just before the new law was to go into effect because of litigation over whether
the law complies with European Union law.189
France has considered data localization rules that may actually be driven by
the country’s national economic interests, too. France’s former Minister for
Small and Medium-Sized Enterprises, Innovation and the Digital Economy,
Fleur Pellerin, declared that it was necessary “to locate datacentres and servers
in [French] national territory in order to better ensure data security.”190 France
has sought to promote French data centers and has stated that it is illegal to use
a non-“sovereign” cloud, which is a foreign cloud provider, for data produced
by national or local governments to ensure that government data is stored and
processed inside of France.191
In addition, Brazil has considered data localization rules as a way to promote
its own domestic technology sector. Former Brazilian President Dilma Rousseff
188. SEGAL, supra note 187, at 155; Mamiit, supra note 187.
189. Gesetz zur Einführung einer Speicherpflicht und einer Höchstspeicherfrist für
Verkehrsdaten [VerkdHSpFruSpPflEG] [Draft Act Introducing a Storage Obligation and a
Maximum Storage Retention Period for Traffic Data], Dec. 10, 2015, BUNDESGESETZBLATT, Teil
I
[BGBL
I]
at
2218
(Ger.),
https://www.bgbl.de/xaver/bgbl/start.xav?startbk=
Bundesanzeiger_BGBl&jumpTo=bgbl115s2218.pdf#__bgbl__%2F%2F*%5B%40attr_id%3D%
27bgbl115s2218.pdf%27%5D__1584838685166 [http://perma.cc/XZK2-Y7D5]; Free Flow of
Data is at the Essence of a True European Digital Single Market, BUS. EUR. (Nov. 29, 2016),
https://www.businesseurope.eu/sites/buseur/files/
media/public_letters/imco/2016-1129_ffd_joint_statement.pdf [hereinafter Free Flow of Data]; Joachim Scherer & Caroline Heinickel,
German Data Retention Obligations Suspended, GLOB. COMPLIANCE NEWS (July 12, 2017),
https://www.bakermckenzie.com/en/insight/publications/2017/07/german-data-retention/; Mirko
Hohmann, German Bundestag Passes New Data Retention Law, LAWFARE (Oct. 16, 2015, 3:40
PM), https://lawfareblog.com/german-bundestag-passes-new-data-retention-law; Maria Sheahan,
German Regulator Suspends Law on Storing Phone and Internet Data, U.S. NEWS (June 28, 2017),
https://www.usnews.com/news/technology/articles/2017-06-28/german-regulator-suspends-lawon-storing-phone-and-internet-data; Verkehrsdatenspeicherung, BUNDESNETZAGENTUR (June 28,
2017),
https://www.bundesnetzagentur.de/DE/Sachgebiete/Telekommunikation/Unternehmen_Institutio
nen/Anbieterpflichten/OeffentlicheSicherheit/Umsetzung110TKG/VDS_113aTKG/VDSnode.html.
190. Valéry Marchive, France Hopes to Turn PRISM Worries into Cloud Opportunities,
ZDNET (June 21, 2013, 9:02 AM), http://www.zdnet.com/article/france-hopes-to-turn-prismworries-into-cloud-opportunities/.
191. Free Flow of Data, supra note 189; MINISTÈRE DE LA CULTURA ET DE LA
COMMUNICATION, NOTE D’INFORMATION DU 5 AVRIL 2016 RELATIVE À L’INFORMATIQUE EN
NUAGE
(CLOUD
COMPUTING)
1–3
(2016),
https://francearchives.fr/file/
f7ace4517613a246583fd2dd673a0e6d0f86c039/static_9151.pdf.
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had long championed policy initiatives to increase the number of Internet
exchange points and increase domestic Internet bandwidth, improve
connectivity (in part by building undersea cables and overland fiber-optic
cables), encourage Internet content providers to be based in Brazil, and promote
the use of domestically produced telecommunications equipment.192 Following
the Snowden disclosures, the Brazilian government announced plans in to
abandon its Microsoft Outlook email services, which are from a foreign United
States-based provider, and move to a domestic email service that uses data
centers inside Brazil.193 Brazil considered requiring Internet companies to store
copies of Brazilian citizens’ data in data servers inside Brazil as part of Brazil’s
Marco Civil da Internet legislation to enable “greater access for Brazilian law
enforcement to data stored abroad or belonging to foreign companies,” but
ultimately removed this provision prior to the legislation being passed.194 The
final law did include a provision that “extends the reach of Brazilian law to any
Internet service in the world with Brazilian users,” which means that “[a] firm
based in the United States whose services are used by Brazilians could, for
example, be penalized for adhering to its domestic data-disclosure laws if they
conflict with Brazil’s.”195 If Brazil aggressively enforces these rules or once
again pursues data localization legislation, United States technology companies
may find it too costly to continue offering their services and products in Brazil.
These data localization rules create barriers to cross-border data flows and
threaten to reduce the ability of United States technology companies to do
business overseas. Governments at times seek to use data localization laws to
force companies to move data-related jobs to their countries in an effort to help
the domestic economies.196 Governments also promote these rules to protect
and promote domestic companies by making it more costly for foreign firms to

192. Bill Woodcock, On Internet, Brazil is Beating U.S. at its Own Game, AL JAZEERA AM.
(Sept. 20, 2013, 2 :45 PM), http://america.aljazeera.com/articles/2013/9/20/brazil-internetdilmarousseffnsa.html.
193. Hill, supra note 177, at 17–18; Angelica Mari, Brazilian Government to Ditch Microsoft
in Favour of Bespoke Email System, ZDNET (Oct. 14, 2013, 6:13 PM), http://www.zdnet.com/
article/brazilian-government-to-ditch-microsoft-in-favour-of-bespoke-email-system/;
Miller,
supra note 177.
194. Hill, supra note 177, at 17–18; see Anthony Boadle, Brazil to Drop Local Data Storage
Rule in Internet Bill, REUTERS (Mar. 18, 2014, 11:25 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/usbrazil-internet/brazil-to-drop-local-data-storage-rule-in-internet-bill-idUSBREA2I03O20140319.
195. Hill, supra note 177, at 18.
196. CORY, supra note 178, at 5. Nigel Cory has found that
[t]hese supposed benefits of data-localization policies are misunderstood. Data centers
have become more automated, meaning that the number of jobs associated with each
facility, especially for technical staff, has decreased. While data centers contain
expensive hardware (which is usually imported) and create some temporary construction
jobs, they employ relatively few full-time staff.
Id.
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do business in their countries.197 The push for data localization could diminish
United States companies’ market share by reducing their competitiveness
abroad, which would aggravate the trend towards a smaller percentage of the
world’s communications transiting the United States because of the growth of
the Internet. Thus, the United States’ home field advantage will likely recede in
the future and the advantages in the Intelligence Community’s ability to acquire
SIGINT through the programs under Section 702 will be diminished.
D. Companies No Longer Cooperating with the Government
SIGINT collection under Section 702 is heavily dependent on a small number
of technology companies that have become less cooperative in the post-Snowden
environment. 198 Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, technology
companies voluntarily aided the government’s surveillance programs described
in Part I prior to the passage of the PAA and FAA.199 However, the relationship
between the government and technology companies has fractured in recent
years, most notably as a result of the Snowden disclosures. Foreign consumers
were extremely alarmed by the disclosures, which described United States
technology companies’ (lawful and compelled) cooperation with the NSA.200
Thus, foreign consumers became distrustful of American products and online
services because they feared that their communications would become
accessible to United States law enforcement or intelligence agencies.201 United
States technology companies lost between $35 and $180 billion in revenue over
the three-year period following the Snowden disclosures.202 This increased the
197. Id. at 6–7.
198. Interview with Benjamin Wittes, supra note 161; Rozenshtein, supra note 67, at 112–16.
199. S. REP. NO. 110-209, at 7; CHARLIE SAVAGE, POWER WARS: INSIDE OBAMA’S POST-9/11
PRESIDENCY 183–87 (2015); Jon D. Michaels, All the President’s Spies: Private-Public
Intelligence Partnerships in the War on Terror, 96 CALIF. L. REV. 901, 910–13 (2008).
200. Miller, supra note 177.
201. See, e.g., id. (discussing the increased skepticism by foreign consumers of United States
technology products and services following the Snowden disclosures); Nicholas Weaver, BandAids Can’t Fix Bullet Holes: Silicon Valley and the NSA, LAWFARE (Sept. 30, 2015, 3:55 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/band-aids-cant-fix-bullet-holes-silicon-valley-and-nsa
(“Silicon
Valley can’t operate without the trust of their customers, and trust, once lost, is hard to regain. The
bad blood will remain for years.”).
202. DANIEL CASTRO, THE INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW MUCH WILL PRISM
COST THE U.S. CLOUD COMPUTING INDUSTRY? 3 (2013), http://www2.itif.org/2013-cloudcomputing-costs.pdf (calculating that United States technology companies would lose up to $35
billion between 2013–2016 following Snowden’s unauthorized disclosures about the NSA’s
intelligence programs) (last visited Mar. 16, 2020); James Staten, The Cost of PRISM Will Be
Larger
Than
ITIF
Projects,
FORRESTER
(Aug.
15,
2013,
11:02
AM),
http://blogs.forrester.com/james_staten/13-08-14the_cost_of_prism_will_be_larger_than_itif_projects (estimating that United States technology
companies could lose up to $180 billion between 2013–2016 because of disclosures about NSA
programs).
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incentive for these technology companies to adopt a more publicly adversarial
relationship with the United States government.203
There is also a significant ideological and cultural divide between many
leaders in the technology industry and the government, which adds to the friction
and desire on the part of technology companies to resist government
surveillance. Professor Amy Zegart has described the “yawning cultural divide
between policymakers in Washington and engineers in Silicon Valley tech
companies” as the “suit-hoodie divide.”204 Many technology leaders have more
libertarian political beliefs than those in government and some are even
ideologically inclined to thwart surveillance efforts.205 These major technology
companies are also multinational corporations with significant global customer
bases, and thus often view themselves as global enterprises that are not
necessarily predisposed to serve the United States government’s interests.
Technology companies have the ability to innovate in a manner that can
frustrate government SIGINT collection efforts. 206 Service providers are
increasingly offering encryption by default, especially end-to-end encryption.207
203. Rozenshtein, supra note 67, at 115–22.
204. Amy Zegart, Policymakers Are From Mars, Tech Company Engineers Are From Venus,
LAWFARE (June 6, 2016, 9:54 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/policymakers-are-mars-techcompany-engineers-are-venus; see Univ. of Tex. at Austin, Weapons of Mass Deception: The
Changing Cyber Landscape, STRAUSS CTR. (Mar. 27, 2018, 12:15 PM),
https://www.strausscenter.org/event/518-a-conversation-with-amy-zegart.html.
205. See Rozenshtein, supra note 67, at 118 (characterizing many technologists as subscribing
to the “Californian Ideology,” which is a “worldview that is simultaneously countercultural in
lifestyle, laissez-faire in economics, and libertarian in politics”); PETER SWIRE, NEW AM., THE
DECLINING HALF-LIFE OF SECRETS: AND THE FUTURE OF SIGNALS AND INTELLIGENCE 4 (2015),
https://static.newamerica.org/attachments/4425-the-declining-half-life-ofsecrets/Swire_DecliningHalf-LifeOfSecrets.f8ba7c96a6c049108dfa85b5f79024d8.pdf (describing
an anti-secrecy and libertarian culture among technologists); Andy Greenberg, Meet Moxie
Marlinspike, The Anarchist Bringing Encryption to All of Us, WIRED (July 31, 2016, 6:45 AM),
https://www.wired.com/2016/07/meet-moxie-marlinspike-anarchist-bringing-encryption-us/
(discussing Moxie Marlinspike’s, a security researcher who developed Signal and helped encrypt
WhatsApp, advocacy of encryption and Marlinspike’s belief that people should be able to use
encryption to break the law because this may inspire social change in some areas); Cade Metz,
Forget Apple vs. the FBI: WhatsApp Just Switched on Encryption for a Billion People, WIRED
(Apr. 5, 2016, 11:08 AM), https://www.wired.com/2016/04/forget-apple-vs-fbi-whatsapp-justswitched-encryption-billion-people/ (observing that it is “an article of faith that’s commonly held
among Silicon Valley engineers” that “online privacy must be protected against surveillance of
all kinds” and that “[i]n Silicon Valley, strong encryption isn’t really up for debate [since] [a]mong
tech’s most powerful leaders, it’s orthodoxy”).
206. See Rozenshtein, supra note 67, at 134–35 (referring to technology companies’ ability to
innovate in this way as “technological unilateralism”).
207. See CHERTOFF GROUP, THE GROUND TRUTH ABOUT ENCRYPTION 1 (2016)
https://cdn2.hubspot.net/hubfs/3821841/docs/238024-282765.groundtruth.pdf (observing that users
formerly had to take affirmative action to use encryption, but now more devices and products encrypt
data by default unless the user takes affirmative action turn this function off); Telephone Interview
with Timothy Edgar, Former Dir. of Privacy & Civil Liberties, Nat’l Sec. Council Staff, Former
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These products encrypt data and communications in such a way that the service
provider does not have the technical ability to decrypt the information.208 Endto-end encryption improves the security of these products against malicious
actors and allows companies to signal that they value customer privacy. 209
Providers that offer unbreakable end-to-end encryption cannot respond to lawful
orders under Section 702 with useful information because they do not possess
the decrypted information that the government is requesting. 210 In 2016,
WhatsApp, an online messaging service on smartphones that is now owned by
Facebook, implemented end-to-end encryption to its service, which is used by
more than two billion people.211
Some have questioned whether end-to-end encryption will be widely adopted
by the technology industry because it conflicts with many companies’ business
models.212 Many technology companies rely on advertising revenue to subsidize
free content and services, and advertising is very dependent on user data to
produce targeted advertisements. 213 End-to-end encryption would reduce
companies’ access to useful user information, which means that companies
could risk losing revenue if they employed end-to-end encryption.214 Access to
consumer data can also enhance a product or service’s security because this can

Nat’l Sec. Counsel, Am. Civil Liberties Union (Feb. 20, 2018) (noting that many companies have
begun using encryption to protect users’ information); Manpearl, supra note 143, at 72 (explaining
that “the burden of action formerly favored not using encryption,” but it will now favor using
encryption because it is often the default setting, and that this will greatly increase the prevalence of
at least endpoint encryption).
208. CHERTOFF GROUP, supra note 207, at 1.
209. See HAROLD ABELSON ET AL., KEYS UNDER DOORMATS: MANDATING INSECURITY BY
REQUIRING GOVERNMENT ACCESS TO ALL DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS 10 (July 6, 2015)
https://dspace.mit.edu/bitstream/handle/1721.1/97690/MIT-CSAIL-TR-2015-026.pdf
(arguing
against a lawful access requirement because of cybersecurity concerns); Rozenshtein, supra note
67, at 138 (stating that companies may use end-to-end encryption to demonstrate that they take user
privacy seriously).
210. CHERTOFF GROUP, supra note 207, at 1; Manpearl, supra note 143, at 72–73; Interview
with Robert S. Litt, Former Gen. Counsel, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l Intelligence, in D.C. (Feb. 14,
2018).
211. Andy Greenberg, WhatsApp Just Switched on End-to-End Encryption for Hundreds of
Millions of Users, WIRED (Nov. 18, 2014, 10:54 AM), https://www.wired.com/2014/11/whatsappencrypted-messaging/; Metz, supra note 205; Two Billion Users—Connecting the World Privately,
WHATSAPP (Feb. 12, 2020), https://blog.whatsapp.com/two-billion-users-connecting-the-worldprivately.
212. MATTHEW G. OLSEN ET AL., BERKMAN CTR. FOR INTERNET & SOC’Y, DON’T PANIC:
MAKING PROGRESS ON THE “GOING DARK” DEBATE 10–12 (2016) https://dash.harvard.edu/
bitstream/handle/1/28552576/Dont_Panic_Making_Progress_on_Going_Dark_Debate.pdf?seque
nce=1&isAllowed=y.
213. Id. at 10–11.
214. Id.
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allow the company to scan for malware, which would not be possible with endto-end encryption.215
However, the Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) insists
that end-to-end encryption poses a significant problem.216 ODNI believes that
there is already a trend developing of companies implementing end-to-end
encryption and United States adversaries using these tools to avoid
surveillance.217 Also, in the aftermath of the NSA announcing the voluntary
termination of “about” collection, Julian Sanchez, a senior fellow at the Cato
Institute, and Nicholas Weaver, a senior researcher at the International Computer
Science Institute and professor in computer science at the University of
California Berkley, speculated that the increasing prevalence of encryption of
email traffic between servers made it more difficult to scan the contents of email
during transit and therefore made “about” collection less useful to the NSA.218
Nicholas Weaver has even stated that “upstream is dying . . . because everything
is getting encrypted.”219
Further, multinational technology companies have global infrastructure and
are building data centers around the world, which enables them to store data
overseas.220 Companies have legitimate business reasons to store data overseas
because some foreign customers may prefer having their data be physically
located in their own countries and storing a user’s data near the physical location
of that user may enhance the quality of service.221 Storing data overseas may
215. See Privacy Policy, GOOGLE (Mar. 31, 2020),
https://www.gstatic.com/policies/privacy/pdf/20200331/acec359e/google_privacy_policy_en_us.
pdf (explaining that Google’s systems analyze user content, including emails, to provide relevant
product features, such as customized search results, tailored advertising, and spam and malware
detection) (last visited Apr. 8, 2020); Andy Greenberg, After 3 Years, Why Gmail’s End-to-End
Encryption is Still Vapor, WIRED (Feb. 28, 2017, 11:27 AM), https://www.wired.com/2017/02/3years-gmails-end-end-encryption-still-vapor/ (acknowledging that end-to-end encryption would
make Gmail’s spam and malware filtering functions much more difficult).
216. See Letter from Deirdre M. Walsh, Chief Operating Officer, Office of the Dir. of Nat’l
Intelligence, to Sen. Ron Wyden 1–2 (May 5, 2016) https://www.wyden.senate.gov/
download/?id=3F716160-095E-420E-93F3-849453EB61B2&download=1 (asserting that the
increased prevalence of encryption has already hampered law enforcement and intelligence
collection activities and that the problem is only growing).
217. Id.
218. Adam Klein, The End of “About” Collection Under Section 702, LAWFARE (May 1, 2017,
10:07 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/end-about-collection-under-section-702; Julian
Sanchez, All About “About” Collection, JUST SEC. (Apr. 28, 2017), https://www.justsecurity.org/
40384/ado-about/; Telephone Interview with Nicholas Weaver, supra note 126.
219. Telephone Interview with Nicholas Weaver, supra note 126.
220. Mark Scott, U.S. Tech Giants are Investing Billions to Keep Data in Europe, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 3, 2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/10/04/technology/us-europe-cloud-computingamazon-microsoft-google.html.
221. In re Warrant to Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft
Corp., 15 F. Supp. 3d 466, 467 (S.D.N.Y. 2014), rev’d and remanded sub nom. In re Warrant to
Search a Certain E-Mail Account Controlled & Maintained by Microsoft Corp. (In re Microsoft),
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make it more difficult for the government to access the data because Section 702
may not empower the government to compel data that is stored overseas. 222
Companies that see a business advantage in opposing government SIGINT
collection efforts or have an ideological reason for doing so may be driven to
intentionally configure their data storage architecture to have data be stored
outside the United States such that the government cannot obtain such
information under Section 702. Although the NSA would not have the same
difficulties that law enforcement has had in obtaining data stored overseas
because the NSA could utilize Executive Order 12333 collection to obtain such
information, as discussed supra in Part I.C, Section 702 offers unique
advantages that Executive Order 12333 lacks so this shift could potentially
diminish the quality of intelligence that the NSA could collect.223
The government is now extremely dependent on technology companies to
facilitate SIGINT collection under Section 702, which means that these private
firms wield tremendous power.224 As Professor Alan Rozenshtein has observed,
this is a stark example of “private actors wielding public power: when, by virtue
of their opposition to a core government activity, they challenge traditional
conceptions of state sovereignty and thereby transform into ‘supercitizens.’”225
829 F.3d 197 (2d Cir. 2016) (stating that “because the quality of service decreases the farther a user
is from the datacenter where his account is hosted, efforts are made to assign each account to the
closest datacenter”), vacated and remanded sub nom. United States v. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct.
1186 (2018); Rozenshtein, supra note 67, at 140–41, 143 (asserting that “companies routinely leave
the decision where to store data to users, allowing them to forum shop with the ease of a drop-down
menu” and that “Microsoft’s network may run more efficiently if it can store data physically near
the data’s user, or even dynamically shift data around the network depending on network
congestion”); Andrew Keane Woods, Against Data Exceptionalism, 68 STAN. L. REV. 729, 761
(2016) (explaining that data is typically stored close to the user).
222. See In re Microsoft, 829 F.3d at 211–22 (concluding that Congress did not intend for the
Stored Communications Act’s (SCA) warrant provision to apply extraterritorially, and therefore an
SCA warrant could not lawfully compel a United States-based service provider, Microsoft, to seize
the contents of its customer’s communications stored abroad in Ireland), vacated and remanded
sub nom. Microsoft Corp., 138 S. Ct. at 1186.
223. See supra Part I.C.
224. See David S. Kris, Modernizing the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: Progress to
Date and Work Still to Come, in LEGISLATING THE WAR ON TERROR 217, 227 (Benjamin Wittes
ed., 2009). In 2008, Ken Wainstein, then-Assistant Attorney General for National Security in the
Department of Justice, described the government’s reliance on technology companies to facilitate
surveillance:
[W]e rely on the communications providers to do our intelligence surveillances. We
can’t do [the surveillances] without them because . . . we . . . don’t own the
communications systems. We need to rely on their assistance. . . . Yes, we can compel
the phone companies, or compel the communications providers to do a surveillance, and
even if they . . . resist a directive . . . we can go to the FISA Court to get our orders
enforced. Problem is, throughout that time, we’re dark on whatever surveillance it is that
we want to go up on.
Id.
225. Rozenshtein, supra note 67, at 187.
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The relationship between the government and technology companies has
become more adversarial in the aftermath of Snowden’s unauthorized
disclosures. Technology companies have sought to regain consumers’
confidence, especially foreign consumers, by innovating technologically in a
manner that reduces their capability to respond to lawful orders. 226 The
widespread adoption of encryption technologies and possible shift to storing data
overseas to avoid complying with lawful surveillance orders may severely
diminish the Intelligence Community’s ability to conduct fruitful SIGINT under
Section 702.
III. STRATEGIES TO ADDRESS THE DIFFICULTIES IN ACCURATELY
DETERMINING LOCATION
The United States’ current legal regime governing SIGINT activities is
predicated on the location of the target. If location becomes significantly more
difficult to determine because of the increased prevalence and advancement of
location-spoofing and anonymity technologies, the United States may have to
reconsider how location should factor into this legal paradigm.
A.

Fourth Amendment Doctrine and the Difficulty in Determining Location

The Fourth Amendment is territorial in nature and a person’s connections to
the United States dictate whether the individual is protected under the Fourth
Amendment. Social contract theory pervaded American political philosophy
prior to the Constitution, and the United States Constitution was drafted as a
social contract between the American people and the United States
government. 227 The social compact stressed that a government’s legitimacy
stems from the consent of the governed.228 Formerly free individuals willingly
226. Id. at 134–43.
227. See Mayflower Compact 1620, in SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES: DOCUMENTARY ORIGINS
OF INDIVIDUAL LIBERTIES IN THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION AND BILL OF RIGHTS 55, 60
(Richard L. Perry ed., rev. 1978) (declaring that “[w]e . . . solemnly and mutually . . . covenant and
combine ourselves together into a civil Body Politick, for our better Ordering and Preservation”);
THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 103–05 (George Routledge & Sons, 2d ed. 1886) (asserting that
individuals agreed to abandon their natural rights and subject themselves to the sovereign to impose
laws and maintain peace); JOHN LOCKE, TWO TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT, in THE WORKS OF
JOHN LOCKE IN NINE VOLUMES 207, 312–13 (12th ed. 1824) (arguing that formerly free people
parted with unrestricted freedom to form commonwealths to enable governments to protect the
rights that individuals cherished); Eric Manpearl, The Privacy Rights of Non-U.S. Persons in
Signals Intelligence, 29 FLA. J. INT’L L. 303, 311 (2018) (detailing the Constitution’s basis in social
contract theory).
228. See THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776). The Declaration of
Independence states:
We hold these truths to be self-evident: that all men are created equal; that they are
endowed, by their Creator with certain unalienable rights; that among these are life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness. That to secure these rights, governments are
instituted among men, deriving their just powers from the consent of the governed.
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united to establish communities by undertaking obligations to the government
in exchange for the protection of certain rights.229
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the
searches of foreigners outside of the United States in Verdugo-Urquidez. 230
Rene Martin Verdugo-Urquidez, a citizen and resident of Mexico, was a leader
of a violent drug cartel in Mexico and was involved in the kidnapping, torture,
and murder of a United States Drug Enforce Administration (DEA) Special
Agent.231 Verdugo-Urquidez was apprehended in Mexico and transported to the
United States border where he was transferred to United States custody.232 DEA
Agents, working with Mexican police, then searched Verdugo-Urquidez’s
properties in Mexico and seized documents to use as evidence.233 The Supreme
Court determined that the Fourth Amendment does not apply to the search and
seizure by United States agents of property owned by a nonresident alien and
located in a foreign country.234 The Court reasoned that the phrase “the people”
in the Fourth Amendment “refers to a class of persons who are part of a national
community or who have otherwise developed sufficient connection with this
country to be considered part of that community.” 235 Therefore, the Fourth
Amendment likely protects individuals who are lawfully present in the United
States because these individuals are either part of the United States’ national
community or likely have sufficient connections to the United States by virtue
of their lawful presence in the country.236 This means that location must be part
Id.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, The Farmer Refuted, in 1 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 81,
88 (Harold C. Syrett & Jacob E. Cooke eds., 1961) (“the origin of all civil government, justly
established, must be a voluntary compact, between the rulers and the ruled; and must be liable to
such limitations, as are necessary for the security of the absolute rights of the latter”).
229. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 404–05 (1819) (declaring that “[t]he
government of the Union . . . is, emphatically and truly, a government of the people . . . it emanates
from them. Its powers are granted by them, and are to be exercised directly on them, and for their
benefit”); Chisolm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. 419, 471 (1793) (stating that “[e]very State Constitution is a
compact . . . and the Constitution of the United States is likewise a compact made by the people of
the United States to govern themselves”).
230. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274–75 (1990).
231. Id. at 262.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. at 274–75.
235. Id. at 265.
236. See Kwong Hai Chew v. Colding, 344 U.S. 590, 596 n.5 (1953) (“The Bill of Rights is a
futile authority for the alien seeking admission for the first time to these shores. But once an alien
lawfully enters and resides in this country he becomes invested with the rights guaranteed by the
Constitution to all people within our borders.”); Martinez-Aguero v. Gonzalez, 459 F.3d 618, 620,
624–25 (5th Cir. 2006) (holding that a foreign resident’s regular visits to the United States and
reliance on a United States consular office’s statement that the person could continue to rely on
an expired visa until a new visa arrived established sufficient contacts with the United States to
provide Fourth Amendment rights). But see Am. Immigration Lawyers Ass’n v. Reno, 18 F. Supp.
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of the legal regime governing SIGINT activities under current Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence, but this may raise serious difficulties as a person’s
true location may become increasingly more difficult to ascertain. This raises
the question of how the law should adapt to the uncertainty of location.
Some have argued that technological advancements have made the world
much more interconnected and that national borders have become less
significant so the Fourth Amendment’s protections should apply to all
individuals—regardless of location or non-United States person status.
Professor Jennifer Daskal has proposed a “presumptive” Fourth Amendment in
which the Fourth Amendment is presumed to apply “regardless of whether the
collection takes place inside or outside the United States, and regardless of
whether the target is a U.S. person or not” unless “the government establishes
that none of the parties to the communication is a U.S. person.” 237 A more
security-oriented approach may be that in a world in which location becomes
extremely difficult to determine accurately, the FISA legal regime governing
SIGINT activities should create a new category for non-United States persons
appearing to be located in the United States. These individuals, who the
Intelligence Community could not develop a reasonable belief that they were
outside the United States, but still reasonably believed were non-United States
persons, could still be targeted if the Intelligence Community has reasonable
suspicion that these individuals are likely to possess, receive, and/or
communicate foreign intelligence information rather than forcing the NSA or
FBI to establish probable cause that these individuals are agents of a foreign
power as long as the Intelligence Community has not conclusively determined
that these individuals are physically located inside the United States. The FISC
would be required to make this reasonable suspicion determination on an
individualized basis. Further, if the Intelligence Community gained conclusive
evidence that the target was actually physically located inside the United States,
then the Intelligence Community would have one week to shift collection to
FISA Title I. Finally, another security-oriented approach would be that if
technology develops and is widely adopted such that determining location
becomes an extreme problem for the NSA and SIGINT collection under Section
702 is severely hindered, it could be necessary to amend FISA by creating two
categories: one for United States persons and one for non-United States persons.
These more security-oriented approaches would each rely heavily on the foreign
intelligence exception to the warrant clause in the Fourth Amendment.

2d 38, 59–60, 60 n.17 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d, 199 F.3d 1352 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (holding that a person
who regularly visited the United States to visit her daughter and grandchild did not have sufficient
“substantial connections” to the United States to satisfy the standard set forth in VerdugoUrquidez).
237. Daskal, supra note 5, at 383.
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1. Extend Fourth Amendment Protections in a Universal Manner
Extending Fourth Amendment protections in a universal manner would
reduce the difficulty presented by not being able to determine accurately a
target’s location because this factor would no longer matter as even non-United
States persons overseas would receive Fourth Amendment protections.238 This
embrace of universal privacy rights would be a major break with the United
States’ social compact tradition and would be an explicit rejection of the holding
in Verdugo-Urquidez.239 The approach would also mean that the United States
would be accepting the enormous security costs that would come from such a
decision. The United States could not maintain nearly the same level of
intelligence capabilities as the Intelligence Community currently has if the
United States adopted the universalist approach. This would inevitably mean
that the Intelligence Community would lose visibility into malicious actors and
threats because the United States—as with all countries—has fewer resources to
identify threats from foreigners abroad compared with its ability to identify
threats from citizens inside the country.240 Ultimately, pursuing this path would
greatly diminish the United States’ capacity to gain intelligence to protect the
United States’ national security interests, the American people, and the
Homeland.

238. See David Cole, More on the Rights of Others—Ben Wittes’ Failure of Imagination, JUST
SEC. (Nov. 12, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/3128/rights-ben-wittes-failure-imagination/
(taking a more global view of governance and advocating for universal privacy rights regardless of
nationality); David Cole, More on Wittes and the Rights of Others, JUST SEC. (Nov. 13, 2013),
https://www.justsecurity.org/3148/wittes-rights/; David Cole, The New U.S. “Red Line”—No
Privacy Rights for Foreigners, JUST SEC. (Nov. 21, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/3567/redline-privacy-rights-foreigners/?print; David Cole, Time to End the Spying Game, THE NATION
(Nov. 13, 2013), https://www.thenation.com/article/time-end-spying-game/; Cole, We Are All
Foreigners: NSA Spying and the Rights of Others, supra note 5; David Cole, We Are All Foreign
Nationals—Even Orin Kerr, JUST SEC. (Nov. 1, 2013), https://www.justsecurity.org/2817/foreignnationals-orin-kerr/.
239. Compare Joseph A. Cannataci (Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy), Report of
the Special Rapporteur on the Right to Privacy, ¶ 52, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/34/60 (Sept. 6, 2017)
(advocating that “[s]tates [should] prepare themselves to ensure that both domestically and
internationally, privacy be respected as a truly universal right and that, especially when it comes
to surveillance carried out on the Internet, privacy [should] not [be] a right that depends on the
passport in your pocket”), with Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 274–75 (holding that the Fourth
Amendment does not apply to the searches of foreigners outside of the United States).
240. See Ryan Goodman, Should Foreign Nationals Get the Same Privacy Protections Under
NSA
Surveillance—or
Less
(or
More)?,
JUST
SEC.
(Oct.
29,
2014),
https://www.justsecurity.org/16797/foreign-nationals-privacy-protections-nsa-surveillance-or-ormore/ (citing national security risks from abroad as a potential reason to offer less privacy
protections to foreigners abroad); Peter Margulies, Sweeping Claims and Casual Legal Analysis in
the Latest U.N. Mass Surveillance Report, LAWFARE (Oct. 20, 2014, 4:11 PM),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/sweeping-claims-and-casual-legal-analysis-latest-un-masssurveillance-report.
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2. A Presumptive Fourth Amendment
Professor Daskal rejects the universalist approach, but still argues for more
expansive privacy protections under a presumptive Fourth Amendment
approach.241 Professor Daskal argues that the rules that govern data collection
activities “should presumptively apply to U.S. persons and non-U.S. persons
alike, regardless of whether the target of the acquisition or the data being
acquired is based in the United States—absent a determination that all parties to
the communication are non-U.S. persons.” 242 This position is based on the
desire to protect United States persons’ communications that may be implicated
in collection activities, especially through incidental collection.243
In practice, this proposal would mean that Fourth Amendment protections
would be extended to most foreign intelligence surveillance targets as it would
be extremely difficult to show that no one in a communication was a United
States person or located inside the United States, especially if location becomes
difficult to ascertain in the future. The approach is certainly contrary to current
practice and would extend Fourth Amendment protections to many foreigners
abroad who are not part of the United States’ social compact and have therefore
not been granted the same privacy protections under law as United States
persons.244
Professor Daskal’s vast extension of Fourth Amendment protections to nonUnited States persons overseas would hinder the Intelligence Community’s
ability to gather intelligence and create a culture of diminished aggressiveness,
which could result in troubling security harms—especially at a time when the
United States faces an exceptionally complex threat environment. The NSA
already employs minimization procedures that dictate how the agency limits the
accessibility, retention, and dissemination of “nonpublicly available information
concerning unconsenting United States persons” who are not the target of the
surveillance. 245 These minimization procedures help protect United States
persons’ privacy interests and diminish the intrusiveness of incidental or
inadvertent collection.

241. Daskal, supra note 5, at 383–87.
242. Id. at 385–86.
243. Id. at 385; PCLOB, REPORT ON SURVEILLANCE PROGRAM, supra note 11, at 114
(explaining that under Section 702, “the term ‘incidental collection’ is used to refer to situations in
which United States persons or people located in the United States have their communications
acquired because they were in contact with a targeted foreigner located overseas”).
244. See Manpearl, supra note 227, at 320 (explaining that “U.S. intelligence efforts have
focused on protecting U.S. persons’ privacy rights and have not been concerned with the privacy
interests of non-U.S. persons outside of the United States”).
245. 50 U.S.C. § 1801(h).
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3. Amend FISA to Create a New Category for Non-United States Persons
Appearing to be Located Inside the United States
If location becomes burdensome and extremely difficult to determine
accurately for the NSA, a more security-oriented reform would be to reform the
FISA legal regime governing surveillance to create a new category for nonUnited States persons that the NSA is not able to establish a reasonable belief
that they are outside of the United States, but still has a reasonable suspicion that
such persons are likely to possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign
intelligence information. Under this reform, there would be three primary FISA
categories: (1) United States persons and individuals conclusively determined to
be physically located inside the United States, (2) non-United States persons
appearing to be located inside the United States, and (3) non-United States
persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States.
FISA has various provisions that distinguish between United States persons
that are inside the United States and United States persons that are reasonably
believed to be outside the United States, but all of these provisions require
probable cause findings that the United States person is “a foreign power or an
agent of a foreign power” 246 (in the case of United States persons inside the
United States) or “a foreign power, an agent of a foreign power, or an officer or
employee of a foreign power”247 (in the case of United States persons that are
reasonably believed to be outside the United States). 248 There are subtle
differences in the way FISA treats these subcategories of United States persons,
but for the purposes of this Article I group these sub-categories of United States
persons together as one category because FISA requires that the FISC make an
individualized probable cause finding prior to the Intelligence Community
targeting any United States persons—regardless of whether they are inside or
outside the United States—under the statute.249 This reform would continue to
require a probable cause finding prior to targeting any United States person or
person conclusively determined to be inside the United States under FISA.
The second category—non-United States persons appearing to be located
inside the United States—would currently not be covered by Section 702 and
the government would likely need to obtain a FISC order based on a probable
cause finding that the person is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power to
target such individuals. Under this reform, the government would only need to
establish reasonable suspicion that a person in this new category is likely to
possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign intelligence information despite
the fact that the person appears to be located inside the United States. This
reform would include the privacy protective measure of requiring that the FISC
make an individualized reasonable suspicion determination prior to the
246.
247.
248.
249.

50 U.S.C. § 1805(a).
50 U.S.C. § 1881b(b).
50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1881b, 1881c, 1881d.
50 U.S.C. §§ 1805, 1881b, 1881c, 1881d.
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Intelligence Community targeting individuals in this category. Further, this
reform would require that if the Intelligence Community gained conclusive
evidence that the target is actually physically located inside the United States
then the Intelligence Community would have one week to shift collection to
FISA Title I.
The final category of non-United States persons reasonably believed to be
outside the United States would remain the same as currently exists under
Section 702.
In a world in which advanced anonymity and location-spoofing technologies
are more prevalent, and cause problems for the NSA in making pre-tasking
foreignness determinations and in conducting post-tasking analysis regarding an
individual’s location, this reform can alleviate some of the difficulties. The
government would be able to target non-United States persons that successfully
use these technologies to hide their true locations and appear to be located inside
the United States as long as the government can meet the less stringent legal
standard of reasonable suspicion instead of requiring the government to establish
probable cause that the target is a foreign power or agent of a foreign power
under FISA Title I. 250 The government would also have an easier time
maintaining SIGINT collection against individuals that were originally targeted
as non-United States persons reasonably believed to be overseas, but during
post-tasking analysis appear to have entered the United States. The government
could transition its collection efforts against such individuals from the nonUnited States persons reasonably believed to be outside the United States
category to the non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the
United States category as long as the government maintained a reasonable
suspicion that the target is likely to possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign
intelligence information. This could help reduce the post-tasking analysis
resource problem that could be created by these technologies and diminish the
number of targets that the government would have to cease collecting on when
it appeared that the individual had entered the United States. The reasonable
suspicion standard in this reform is a less demanding legal hurdle than the
probable cause determination in FISA Title I, which should reduce the potential
for situations in which the government was able to collect on a target under
Section 702, but did not have enough information to target the person under
FISA Title I. Also, it would not require as much time to establish reasonable
suspicion as is currently needed for FISA Title I applications.251 The reasonable
250. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (giving the FISA Title I legal standards); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 19–27 (1968) (finding that a law enforcement officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot, which is a less demanding hurdle than probable cause).
251. Compare Comey, supra note 58 (describing that FISA Title I applications are lengthy
documents and undergo significant internal oversight and external judicial oversight), and Roberts,
supra note 17 (quoting former Director of National Intelligence (DNI) Admiral Mike McConnell
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suspicion determination would be made by the FISC on an individualized basis
because of the privacy concerns that are implicated by the fact that some of these
targets that are non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the
United States will indeed actually be located inside the United States and not
just using technologies to try to thwart NSA SIGINT collection that make this
appear to be the case.
This reform would also require that if the Intelligence Community gained
conclusive evidence that the target is actually physically located inside the
United States then the Intelligence Community would have one week to shift
collection to FISA Title I. There will certainly be some instances in which the
non-United States person appearing to be located inside the United States target
will indeed truly be located inside the United States and intelligence will reveal
this information. For example, an FBI agent may positively identify a nonUnited States person foreign intelligence target inside the United States while
conducting physical surveillance or biometrics may establish that a non-United
States person foreign intelligence target has entered the United States. These
examples would both meet the conclusive evidence standard under this reform
to require that the Intelligence Community shift collection to FISA Title I. The
information required to meet this conclusive evidence standard does not need to
be as concrete as these examples, but solely having email content that says that
a target is inside the United States would not be sufficient enough under this
reform to require the Intelligence Community to shift collection to FISA Title I
because this information could be manipulated as part of tradecraft to
complement the use of anonymity or location-spoofing technologies. Analysts
would be required to assess whether a non-United States person appearing to be
located inside the United States target can actually be conclusively determined
to be physically located inside the United States whenever new information
regarding location is acquired, and analysts would be required to document their
assessments. These assessments would be periodically reviewed to ensure that
the Intelligence Community is adhering to the reformed legal regime.
This reform relies heavily on the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant
requirement. Non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the
United States are likely entitled to Fourth Amendment protections because these
individuals likely have sufficient connections (or appear to have sufficient
connections in regard to individuals that only appear to be located inside the
United States by virtue of their use of anonymity or location-spoofing
technologies) to the United States by virtue of their lawful presence in the
country.252 The government’s action in regard to this new category must comply
with the Fourth Amendment’s reasonableness requirement to be
as stating “[i]t takes about 200 man hours to do [a FISA application for] one telephone number”),
with Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 326 (1987) (recognizing that “reasonable suspicion … means
something less than probable cause”).
252. See cases cited supra note 236.
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constitutional.253 The government has an extremely strong interest in collecting
foreign intelligence information and the Supreme Court has noted that “[i]t is
‘obvious and unarguable’ that no governmental interest is more compelling than
the security of the Nation.”254 This new legal regime would only be created as
a result of significant problems for the government in accurately determining
location because of the advances and prevalence of anonymity and locationspoofing technologies, which means that the government’s ability to conduct
speedy SIGINT collection for foreign intelligence purposes would potentially be
diminished without the reform. This adds to the gravity of the threat the reform
is intended to address. 255 Further, this new legal regime would have the
protection of requiring prior judicial review, as a FISC judge would be required
to make the determination that there is reasonable suspicion that the target is
likely to possess, receive, and/or communicate foreign intelligence information.
The legal regime would also continue to have the protections of requiring that
targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and certifications be approved
by the FISC. In addition, this reform would have the significant protection of
requiring the Intelligence Community to shift collection to FISA Title I if it
gained conclusive evidence that the target is actually physically located inside
the United States. The government’s interest and the protections granted to the
targeted persons’ privacy rights must be weighed against the privacy intrusion that
occurs.256 Surveillance constitutes a significant intrusion into the privacy rights
of the individual who is targeted. SIGINT collection can reveal intimate
information about an individual, such as one’s political association, religious
belief, and sexual habits.257 Despite this intrusion, “the ultimate touchstone of the
Fourth Amendment is ‘reasonableness’” and the protections put in place under this
253. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
254. Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 307 (1981) (quoting Aptheker v. Sec’y of State, 378 U.S.
500, 509 (1964)).
255. Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 451 (1990) (determining that the
severity of the drunk driving problem and state’s interest in eliminating drinking and driving were
significant factors in making sobriety checkpoints constitutional).
256. See Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013) (the ‘“traditional standards of
reasonableness’ requires a court to weigh ‘the promotion of legitimate governmental interests’
against ‘the degree to which [the search] intrudes upon an individual’s privacy’” (quoting Wyoming
v. Houghton, 526 U.S. 295, 300 (1999)).
257. See Riley v. California, 573 U.S. 373, 396–99 (2014) (describing the significant privacy
intrusion of searching cell phones, and observing that
a cell phone search would typically expose to the government far more than the most
exhaustive search of a house: A phone not only contains in digital form many sensitive
records previously found in the home; it also contains a broad array of private information
never found in a home in any form—unless the phone is);
United States v. Jones, 565 U.S. 400, 415 (2012) (Sotomayor, J., concurring) (asserting that GPS
surveillance “generates a precise, comprehensive record of a person’s public movements that
reflects a wealth of detail about her familial, political, professional, religious, and sexual
associations”).
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regime should be deemed reasonable in view of the significant government interest
at stake to uphold the government’s action as reasonable.258
The primary concerns with this reform are that SIGINT collection targeting
non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the United States will
implicate more United States persons in incidental collection than currently
occurs under Section 702 and that collecting on targets appearing to be located
inside the United States based solely on reasonably suspicion, not probable
cause, increases the potential for domestic political abuse. While this reform
would be intended to address the difficulties in accurately determining location
because of technological advancements that hinder the Intelligence
Community’s ability to determine accurately and quickly that a target that
appears to be inside the United States is actually just using technological tools
to make it appear that way and is not truly inside the United States, the new
category of non-United States persons appearing to be located inside the United
States would inevitably encompass people who actually are present in the United
States, such as foreign diplomats. That is why this reform would require the
Intelligence Community to shift collection to FISA Title I if it gained conclusive
evidence that the target is actually physically located inside the United States.
People who are actually present in the United States are much more likely to be
in contact with Americans, which means that there will be a significant
likelihood that SIGINT collection targeting these individuals will result in quite
a lot of incidental collection on Americans. This raises the potential for domestic
political abuse, which was a core concern that led to the original FISA statute
being passed in 1978. The passage of the original FISA in 1978 expressed “a
deep concern about potential government abuse within our own political
system.” 259 FISA prohibits reverse targeting, too, which is a significant
protection against the government taking advantage of a lesser legal hurdle to
collect on a non-United States person as a pretext for the actual purpose of
acquiring information about United States persons that have not separately been
deemed appropriate targets by the FISC.260 These protections help to ensure that
the original FISA’s intent to provide “special protections for United States
persons . . . as a crucial safeguard of democratic accountability and effective
self-governance within the American political system” would continue to exist
under this reform.261
Further, this reform could take advantage of minimization at the point of
collection to enhance privacy protections for the United States persons who
communicate with the non-United States person appearing to be located inside
258. Riley, 134 S. Ct. at 2482 (quoting Brigham City v. Stuart, 547 U. S. 398, 403 (2006)).
259. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 18, at 154 (describing the original FISA statute’s stringent
legal restrictions on surveillance of United States persons as reflecting “not only a respect for
individual privacy, but also—and fundamentally—a deep concern about potential government
abuse within our own political system”).
260. 50 U.S.C. § 1881a(b).
261. CLARKE ET AL., supra note 18, at 154.
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the United States target. Data acquired under this new category could also be
tagged and treated as a special category of information that has a relatively short
retention period. There is obviously increased risk by imposing enhanced
minimization requirements and subjecting this data to shorter retention periods
because information that might become important later on would have been
deleted, which creates the potential that an important relationship connection or
illicit activity could be missed. Nonetheless, the privacy concerns regarding the
increased incidental collection of United States person communications may be
significant enough to warrant these measures. These back-end privacy
protections enhance the reasonableness of this reform proposal under the Fourth
Amendment, too.
4. Amend FISA to Distinguish Based Only on United States Person vs. NonUnited States Person Status
Another security-oriented reform would be to remove location as a statutory
factor in determining what legal standard should apply, and solely distinguish
based on whether a target is a United States person or non-United States person.
This reform would go even further than the proposal discussed in Part III.A.3,
but could be necessary if technology develops to the point that location can no
longer be accurately determined for a significant number of targets to the extent
that collection efforts under Section 702 are severely hindered. Under this
approach, SIGINT collection targeting United States persons would continue to
have to be based on a probable cause finding by a FISC judge that the person is
a foreign power or agent of a foreign power. SIGINT collection targeting nonUnited States persons would only be based on a finding made by government
officials that there is reasonable suspicion that the person is likely to possess,
receive, and/or communicate foreign intelligence information. Intelligence
Community officials would make this determination based on targeting
procedures, minimization procedures, and certifications that are approved by the
FISC such that this category would function the way Section 702 currently
operates, and not require individualized findings of reasonable suspicion by the
FISC. Section 702 currently has more than 164,000 targets,262 so it would likely
not be practically possible to require the FISC to make a reasonable suspicion
determination on each one of these targets plus the other non-United States
person targets that would now be included in this reformed category that were
previously not targeted under Section 702.
This would simplify the government’s efforts because the Intelligence
Community would no longer have to make a determination regarding a target’s
location under the statute. The Intelligence Community would only have to
make determinations regarding the target’s status as a United States person or
non-United States person and the foreign intelligence purpose. In practice, a
target’s location has significant intelligence value so analysts will likely still try
262. DNI, TRANSPARENCY REPORT 2018, supra note 4, at 13.
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to determine this piece of information, but this determination would not have
legal significance because of the extreme technical challenges in accurately
obtaining this information. The government would be able to target non-United
States persons that successfully use these technologies to hide their true
locations and appear to be located inside the United States as long as the
government can meet the less stringent legal standard of reasonable suspicion
instead of requiring the government to establish probable cause that the target is
a foreign power or agent of a foreign power under FISA Title I.263 Also, the
Intelligence Community would not face problems in conducting post-tasking
analysis because it would not be legally significant if the target appeared to have
entered the United States during post-tasking analysis as long as the government
still had the reasonable belief that the person was a non-United States person and
reasonable suspicion that the person is likely to possess, receive, and/or
communicate foreign intelligence information.
This reform proposal places a significant amount of weight on the foreign
intelligence exception. Some of the individuals in the non-United States persons
category will surely be present inside the United States and therefore likely have
Fourth Amendment rights by virtue of likely having sufficient connections to
the United States. 264 The government’s action would therefore need to be
reasonable to be constitutional under the Fourth Amendment. As discussed
supra, the government’s interest in collecting foreign intelligence information
to protect national security is a compelling interest of the upmost importance.265
This new legal regime would only be created if location was no longer a
practically useful factor to consider because of the evolutions in technology,
which would transform the location factor in the current FISA legal regime into
a significant and dangerous hindrance. This means that the reform proposal
would only be enacted if maintaining the status quo posed a significant threat.
Unlike the proposal in Part III.A.3, this proposal would not have the added
protection of requiring individualized judicial review prior to SIGINT collection
against non-United States person targets because prior individualized judicial
review would not be possible given the scale of collection efforts against more
than 164,000 non-United States person targets. This legal regime would
continue to have the protection of requiring that targeting procedures,
minimization procedures, and certifications be approved by the FISC as with the
current Section 702 design. The government’s interest and the protections
granted to the targeted persons’ privacy rights must be weighed against the

263. See 50 U.S.C. § 1805(a) (giving the FISA Title I legal standards); Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S.
1, 20–27 (1968) (finding that a law enforcement officer may conduct a brief investigatory stop,
consistent with the Fourth Amendment, when the officer has reasonable, articulable suspicion that
criminal activity is afoot, which is a less demanding hurdle than probable cause).
264. See cases cited supra note 236.
265. See supra Part II.
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privacy intrusion that occurs.266 Surveillance constitutes a significant intrusion
into the privacy rights of the individual who is targeted. SIGINT collection can
reveal intimate information about an individual.267 The reasonableness of the
government’s activities under this reform proposal is less certain because of the
lack of individualized prior judicial review, even for those non-United States
persons that are located inside the United States and therefore have Fourth
Amendment rights. The significance of the government’s interests and
protections provided by the targeting procedures, minimization procedures, and
certifications may be sufficient to make the government’s action reasonable.
Further, the technological developments that would necessitate this type of
reform could force significant Fourth Amendment doctrinal developments,
which may place this reform proposal on stronger constitutional footing.
This reform proposal presents the same concerns as discussed in Part III.A.3
because solely distinguishing based on United States person and non-United
States person status will lead to SIGINT collection targeting non-United States
persons located inside the United States. This implicates more United States
persons in incidental collection than currently occurs under Section 702 and
collecting on targets inside the United States based solely on reasonably
suspicion, not probable cause, increases the potential for domestic political
abuse. Reverse targeting would still be prohibited, which is a significant
protection. However, there is less of an upside in creating strict minimization
procedures with relatively short retention periods for information collected on
non-United States persons under this reform because the vast majority of
individuals in this category would be non-United States persons overseas, and
therefore would not have Fourth Amendment rights. The security costs that can
result by deleting information that may be useful at a later point in time would
also be greater under this reform than the reform in Part III.A.3 because the
category of all non-United States person targets is much larger than the category
of non-United States persons located inside the United States. Nonetheless, it
may be necessary to have strict minimizations procedures despite the security
costs to increase the reasonableness of the reform proposal under the Fourth
Amendment. This proposal goes much further than the reform proposal in Part
III.A.3 and would likely only be desirable under the most extreme
circumstances.
B.

Reforming Procedures to be More Forward Leaning

It may be prudent to create more forward leaning procedures to ease some of
the difficulties that could be caused by increased uncertainty of the location of
targets. One approach would be to build “lists of IP addresses [that are]
266. Maryland v. King, 569 U.S. 435, 448 (2013) (quoting Wyoming v. Houghton, 526 U.S.
295, 300 (1999)).
267. See supra note 257 and accompanying text.
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associated with known VPN providers.”268 This would ensure that when a target
uses one of the United States-based VPNs that the NSA is aware of, the analysts
can immediately learn that the target is using a location-spoofing device and has
not actually entered the United States—or at least know that this piece of
information does not indicate that the target has entered the United States.
Creating lists of IP addresses that are associated with known VPN providers
would also enhance privacy protections for United States persons because
United States persons located inside the United States may use VPN providers
that are based overseas, and therefore the United States person’s IP address
would indicate that they were abroad. If the NSA had knowledge that the
specific IP address was associated with a VPN, this piece of information would
be given no weight in the foreignness determination that is based on the totality
of the circumstances, which would diminish the potential for inadvertent
collection on a United States person. The NSA could bring the “lists of IP
addresses [that are] associated with known VPN providers” to the FISC’s
attention to ensure that the FISC is aware that the NSA is taking such measures
to deal with the problem of determining location when targets use locationspoofing technologies.269
If procedures allow for greater collection of communications on the front-end,
the Intelligence Community can develop greater back-end privacy protections to
ensure that collection efforts remain reasonable under the Fourth Amendment.
The Intelligence Community can tag the data collected from targets that appear
to have entered the United States and have shorter retention periods and stricter
dissemination limits on this data if the Intelligence Community is authorized to
continue collecting on these targets, either because one of the reforms proposed
above in Parts III.A.3 or III.A.4 were adopted or because the NSA gained
approval to ignore indicators from the IP addresses that are associated with
known United States-based VPN providers. Although these SIGINT programs
and databases are already extremely complex and adding in more complexity
increases the potential for compliance issues, data tagging seems to be an
increasingly useful tool in helping the Intelligence Community place special
rules on certain data.270
Finally, the Intelligence Community should be proactive in explaining the
technological challenges that it faces to the FISC.271 This will help to better
inform FISC judges of impending problems and avoid situations in which in
268. Kris, supra note 65, at 414.
269. Id.
270. See Frank R. Konkel, Managing the Deluge, GOV’T EXEC. (Nov. 11, 2014),
https://www.govexec.com/magazine/magazine-analysis/2014/11/managing-deluge/98579/
(describing the NSA’s process of tagging data to implement access controls to different data).
271. See Interview with Carrie F. Cordero, supra note 158 (stating that the NSA can develop
a positive relationship with the DOJ and FISC by keeping the DOJ and FISC better informed about
the technological changes that the Intelligence Community is facing).
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which technological challenges become compliance problems. 272 It is in the
NSA’s interest to avoid situations in which it has to report compliance problems
to the FISC after they have occurred to try to explain why it has not been able to
implement the collection as originally presented to the FISC in the application,
and as approved in the court order.273 Ideally, a more proactive approach would
create a more collaborative environment where the NSA, Department of Justice
(DOJ), and FISC develop rules and procedures that allow for flexibility to adjust
to new technical challenges while providing adequate privacy protections.274
IV. WHAT’S PAST IS PROLOGUE: THE NECESSITY TO RELY HEAVILY ON
EXECUTIVE ORDER 12333 TO DEAL WITH A DIMINISHED HOME FIELD
ADVANTAGE AND REDUCED COMPLIANCE BY TECHNOLOGY COMPANIES
As the Internet continues to grow, more transmission facilities will be built
around the world, which will diminish communications networks’ reliance on
United States-based physical infrastructure. 275 This means that a smaller
percentage of the world’s communications will transit the United States. The
reduction in the United States’ home field advantage will diminish the
usefulness of Section 702 in the future.276 The push towards data localization
could diminish United States companies’ market share and could exacerbate the
trend towards a smaller percentage of the world’s communications transiting the
United States. 277 Further, United States-based multi-national technology
companies have innovated technologically, especially in the aftermath of the
Snowden disclosures, in a manner that reduces their ability to respond to lawful
surveillance orders and makes intelligence collection more difficult. The
widespread adoption of encryption has created difficulties for the Intelligence
Community—and will likely create significant problems in the future—and the
possible shift to storing data overseas to avoid complying with lawful orders
may also reduce the usefulness of Section 702.278 As Section 702 becomes less
useful in the future, the Intelligence Community must assess how it can improve
collection under Executive Order 12333 to ensure that the government continues
to acquire vital intelligence to protect United States national security interests.279

272. Id.
273. Id.
274. See id. (arguing that it is a better approach for the NSA to work with the FISC to adjust
procedures to match the technology changes as the NSA sees them occurring and as the NSA
initially starts to grapple with the developments, rather than after developments have created more
significant hardships that result in compliance issues).
275. Hecht, supra note 172; Kris, supra note 65, at 416–17; see Bryant, supra note 172; Singel,
supra note 172.
276. See supra Part II.C.
277. See supra Part II.C.
278. See supra Part II.D.
279. See supra Part II.D.
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There are a number of areas that the Intelligence Community should focus on
to enhance Executive Order 12333 SIGINT collection. The Intelligence
Community should continue to invest significant resources in decrypting
communications, especially in technologies that can assist in being able to
decrypt communications at scale; continue to conduct outreach to technology
companies whose cooperation will always be helpful in SIGINT collection
because these private companies own the communications systems; and increase
the focus on obtaining cooperation from foreign entities and compromising key
strategic targets. Further, beyond enhancing SIGINT collection capabilities, the
Intelligence Community must concentrate on how to develop and improve
technological tools that can assist in conducting intelligence analysis at scale to
be able to sift through and make sense of the massive quantities of data that are
collected.
A.

Obtain Decrypted Communications and Invest in Decrypting
Communications

The increased prevalence of encryption creates a serious impediment to the
Intelligence Community being able to obtain useful information. Although the
NSA may have the technical and cryptographic skills to be able to decrypt a lot
of data, the widespread adoption of encryption technologies still poses a
significant problem because the NSA may not be able to decrypt the information
at the scale that is needed. One approach to alleviating the difficulties that
encryption poses for Section 702 would be for Congress to enact a lawful access
requirement.280 Encryption would still pose a problem for SIGINT collection
that occurs under Executive Order 12333, which will become more important as
the United States’ home field advantage diminishes, regardless of whether
Congress enacts a lawful access requirement because technology companies
outside of the United States are also adopting encryption technologies.281 The
NSA must therefore continue to invest resources in being able to decrypt
communications and acquiring unencrypted communications.
There is a currently a robust debate over whether there should be a lawful
access requirement to mandate that companies maintain access to users’
communications and data, and provide law enforcement or intelligence agencies
with access upon receipt of a lawful order. 282 If Congress enacted a lawful

280. See Manpearl, supra note 143, at 93; Eric Manpearl, The International Front of the Going
Dark Debate, 22 VA. J.L. & TECH. 158, 161–69 (2019) [hereinafter Manpearl, International Front
of the Going Dark Debate].
281. See BRUCE SCHNEIER ET AL., A WORLDWIDE SURVEY OF ENCRYPTION PRODUCTS 2
(2016),
https://www.schneier.com/academic/paperfiles/worldwide-survey-of-encryptionproducts.pdf (finding that there are “546 encryption products from outside the [United States]”).
282. See, e.g., Stewart Baker, How Long Will Unbreakable Commercial Encryption Last?,
LAWFARE (Sept. 20, 2019, 8:00 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/how-long-will-unbreakable-
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access requirement, the NSA would be able to acquire targets’ plaintext
communications from technology companies upon issuing a directive under
Section 702 because the companies would be required to maintain access to their
users’ communications. This would alleviate the difficulties that encryption
poses to Section 702 collection.
However, the private sector and some cryptographers fear that the
technological architecture that would guarantee law enforcement and
intelligence agencies access would compromise user security and privacy. 283
Building in lawful access would increase systems’ complexities, which would
increase vulnerabilities because the new feature could interact with existing
features in unintended and unknown ways.284 Also, the encryption keys that
would need to be retained by the companies, government, or third party would
become targets for illicit actors to attack.285 Thus, user security could be put at
greater risk with a lawful access requirement. This could result in increased theft
of intellectual property through cybercrime, which already costs United States
companies about $250 billion per year.286
Also, surveillance by governments that have less robust legal processes as the
United States would be made easier by the new technological architecture
because United States products are used around the world.287 A lawful access
requirement may conflict with the United States’ foreign policy interests at times
when unbreakable encryption could be favored because dissidents could use it
to challenge authoritarian regimes.288 Further, sophisticated illicit actors would
be able to encrypt their communications regardless of whether the United States
mandated lawful access because they could switch to foreign technology
services and products that would continue to offer unbreakable encryption
because they would not be affected by the United States’ lawful access
commercial-encryption-last; see generally Manpearl, supra note 143; Manpearl, International
Front of the Going Dark Debate, supra note 280.
283. See, e.g., ABELSON ET AL., supra note 209, at 10 (arguing against a lawful access
requirement because of cybersecurity concerns).
284. Id. at 15–16.
285. Id.
286. Keith B. Alexander, U.S. Cyber Command Commander & NSA Dir., Cybersecurity and
American Power, Address at the American Enterprise Institute 15:57–16:02 (July 9, 2012),
http://www.aei.org/events/cybersecurity-and-american-power/.
287. See Lu Wang, Tech Giants Are Now Global Stock Leaders, BLOOMBERG (Feb. 2, 2016,
11:00 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-02-02/facebook-ascent-cementsreign-of-u-s-tech-in-global-stock-ranks (discussing how the demand for United States technology
products around the world has spurred United States technology companies to become the largest
companies in the world).
288. See, e.g., Andrea Peterson, The NSA is Trying to Crack Tor. The State Department is
Helping Pay for It, WASH. POST (Oct. 5, 2013), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/theswitch/wp/2013/10/05/the-nsa-is-trying-to-crack-tor-the-state-department-is-helping-pay-forit/?utm_term=.8c9b8767725f (reporting on the State Department’s efforts to teach activists and
journalists to use Tor and other counter-surveillance technologies during the Arab Spring).
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requirement. 289 Finally, requiring lawful access could further diminish the
market share and economic viability of United States companies because this
requirement could reinforce foreign consumers’ beliefs that using American
products or online services would make their communications accessible to
United States law enforcement or intelligence agencies.290 This could contribute
even more to the erosion of the United States’ home field advantage and
diminish the United States’ economic strength, which is an important aspect of
the United States’ role in the world.291
Some of the concerns that caution against a lawful access requirement may
not be as severe as some have argued. Several major Internet companies
currently have the ability to decrypt information and have not suffered major
security problems, which indicates that these companies’ services may not be
made insecure by having the ability to decrypt information. For example,
Google has the ability to decrypt Gmail and Gchat communications because this
allows Google to target users for advertisements.292 Also, Gmail is able to filter
spam, which can contain malware, because Google can read emails’ plaintext,
which would not be possible with end-to-end encryption.293 Google offers the
full text search of files stored in the cloud, which requires access to plaintext,
too, and could not occur with end-to-end encryption.294 There have not been
security issues with Google’s services thus far.295
Further, consumers may care more about being able to be connected to friends,
having easy to use and reliable products, and having sleek interfaces and useful
applications, and may be willing to sacrifice some privacy and security in
exchange. A recent study surveying 1,510 participants, including both
information technology security experts and non-experts, from the United
States, United Kingdom, and Germany found that privacy and security only play
a minor role in people’s decisions to use a particular mobile instant
messenger. 296 The primary reason that participants gave for using a mobile
instant messenger “was whether friends were using the messenger.”297 Of those
surveyed, 46.1% of participants from the United States, 48.2% of participants
289. SCHNEIER ET AL., supra note 281, at 6.
290. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 177 (discussing the increased skepticism by foreign
consumers of United States technology products following the Snowden disclosures).
291. Manpearl, supra note 143, at 83 (recognizing that “[e]conomic strength enables countries
to have political and military power and to have strong geopolitical influence”).
292. Benjamin Wittes, Five Hard Encryption Questions, LAWFARE (Aug. 7, 2015, 2:14 PM),
https://lawfareblog.com/five-hard-encryption-questions.
293. Greenberg, supra note 215.
294. OLSEN ET AL., supra note 212, at 11.
295. Wittes, supra note 292.
296. ALEXANDER DE LUCA ET AL., USENIX, EXPERT AND NON-EXPERT ATTITUDES
TOWARDS (SECURE) INSTANT MESSAGING 147–51 (2016) https://www.usenix.org/system/files/
conference/soups2016/soups2016-paper-de-luca-.pdf.
297. Id. at 149.
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from the United Kingdom, and 54.9% of participants from Germany stated this
was the main reason they used a particular mobile instant messenger.298 On the
other hand, only a small percentage of participants stated the main reason they
used a mobile instant messenger was because of privacy and security.299 Only
5.6% of participants from the United States, 3.4% of participants from the
United Kingdom, and 13.1% of participants from Germany stated this was the
main reason that they used a particular mobile instant messenger. 300 If
consumers are not driven to select products and services based on whether they
offer unbreakable encryption, then perhaps the fear that United States companies
will lose market share and that the economic viability of United States
companies would be hurt by a lawful access requirement is overstated. A full
discussion of the arguments in the “going dark” debate, which is a complex
issue, is beyond the scope of this Article. I have previously advocated for a
lawful access requirement and believe that pursuing this policy would help to
maintain the usefulness of SIGINT collection under Section 702.301
Regardless of whether Congress enacts a lawful access requirement, it is
important for the Intelligence Community to develop strategies to address
widespread encryption. Acquiring communications is most useful if the
Intelligence Community can decrypt the information or get the information in
plaintext form. Continuing to invest in technologies that can aid in decryption
is extremely important, especially technologies that can assist in the decryption
of large quantities of information. Quantum computing may be an enormous
breakthrough in being able to decrypt information at scale. The Intelligence
Community may need to devote more resources towards compromising major
foreign ISPs, discussed more infra, 302 to collect traffic as it transits the
companies’ infrastructure.
If the company has access to plaintext
communications for its own business reasons, then compromising that company
will allow the Intelligence Community to collect unencrypted communications.
Nonetheless, the Intelligence Community may still have to devote more
resources towards decryption if the company’s internal traffic is encrypted in
this scenario.
End-to-end encryption poses another problem. The Intelligence Community
will have to devote resources to conducting man-in-the-middle attacks and
compromising end-users to obtain desired communications when it encounters
end-to-end encryption. If the government is interested in a particular
conversation between two individuals, the government can relay the messages
between the users to trick the users into thinking that they are connecting directly
with each other when in reality the government has inserted itself into the
298.
299.
300.
301.
302.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Manpearl, supra note 143, at 93–99.
See infra Part IV.C.
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communications as an attacker.303 For example, if the government is interested
in a particular conversation between two individuals, Alice and Bob, the
government can attempt to replace the Bob’s public encryption key with its own
Intelligence Community public key to conduct an active man-in-the-middle
attack because Alice will now be sending her messages to the Intelligence
Community and not Bob. 304 The Intelligence Community can then forward
Alice’s messages to Bob so as not to tip off Bob to the fact that the Intelligence
Community has inserted itself into Alice and Bob’s communications. 305 The
Intelligence Community could even change messages that Alice sends to Bob so
that Bob sees the manipulated messages if this would be useful for an intelligence
operation. 306 Often times, the Intelligence Community will first need to
compromise the private key of a trusted intermediary company that serves as a
broker of public keys in order for the Intelligence Community to be able to send
Alice the Intelligence Community’s public key as a replacement for Bob’s public
key and successfully trick Alice into thinking she has actually been given Bob’s
public key. 307 Conducting narrowly targeted man-in-the-middle attacks and
compromising specific end-users may be quite resource intensive because these
types of attacks do not generally provide for broad collection opportunities.308
Therefore, these attacks against end-to-end encryption may only be feasible
against higher value targets.309 Finally, the Intelligence Community will need to
continue to exploit metadata with technical analysis because metadata is often
unencrypted. While metadata can be “a valuable source of information” and
help map networks, “it does not replace the definitive value of content.”310
B.

Improved Cooperation from Companies

Despite the rather adversarial relationship between some companies and the
United States government that has developed in the aftermath of the Snowden
disclosures, this environment may not persist forever. The United States
government should continue to work to develop strong relationships with United
States technology companies and seek to mend to fissures that have been
created. Technology companies have been great innovators for our society and
are extremely important to the United States economy. In 2014, Internet-related
303. Tanmay Patange, How to Defend Yourself Against MITM or Man-in-the-Middle Attack,
HACKERSPACE (Nov. 10, 2013, 8:37 AM), https://hackerspace.kinja.com/how-to-defend-yourselfagainst-mitm-or-man-in-the-middl-1461796382.
304. Id.
305. Id.
306. Id.
307. Id.
308. Interview with Eric Greenwald, Former Senior Dir. for Cybersecurity, Nat’l Sec. Council
Staff, in Austin, Tex. (Mar. 21, 2018).
309. Id.
310. Letter from Deirdre Walsh to Sen. Ron Wyden, supra note 216, at 2.
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companies in the United States generated $966.2 billion in revenue, which
accounted for six percent of real Gross Domestic Product. 311 “Economic
strength enables countries to have political and military power and to have strong
geopolitical influence.” 312 Therefore, the government should continue to
champion the innovations that occur at these companies. Further, these privatesector technology companies will develop many of the technological tools that
the Intelligence Community will use in the future as an increasing amount of
technology is being produced in the private sector rather than inside the
government. 313 For example, Amazon has contracted with the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) to provide cloud computing for the Intelligence
Community, and the National Geospatial-Intelligence Agency (NGA) has
contracted with private firms “to enhance artificial intelligence and automation
to improve geospatial-intelligence analysis.” 314 Working to maintain and
improve relationships across the board with technology companies can pay
dividends in obtaining better cooperation in the future. Cooperation from
technology companies will always be very helpful to SIGINT collection because
private companies own the communications systems.315
311. STEPHEN E. SIWEK, INTERNET ASS’N, MEASURING THE U.S. INTERNET SECTOR 5 (2015),
https://internetassociation.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/Internet-Association-Measuring-theUS-Internet-Sector-12-10-15.pdf.
312. Manpearl, supra note 143, at 83; Manpearl, International Front of the Going Dark
Debate, supra note 280, at 169.
313. See Noel Calhoun, Private and Government Defense and Intelligence Agencies Must
Work Together, THE HILL (Jan. 26, 2018, 10:15 AM), http://thehill.com/opinion/technology/
370852-private-and-government-defense-and-intelligence-agencies-must-work (acknowledging
that the private sector possesses state of the art technological tools and can develop innovative
technologies rapidly, and providing advice on how the government and private sector can work
together to better leverage private industry’s capabilities to serve national security needs).
314. NGA Awards Four Contracts to Enhance Artificial Intelligence and Automation, NAT’L
GEOSPATIAL-INTELLIGENCE
AGENCY
(Feb.
15,
2017),
https://www.nga.mil/ProductsServices/Pages/NGA-awards-four-contracts-to-enhance-artificialintelligence-and-automation.aspx. See Frank Konkel, The Details About the CIA’s Deal with
Amazon, ATL. (July 17, 2014), https://www.theatlantic.com/technology/archive/2014/07/thedetails-about-the-cias-deal-with-amazon/374632/; Stew Magnuson, Geospatial Agency to Share
Historical Data with Private Sector, Start-Ups, NAT’L DEF. (June 5, 2017),
http://www.nationaldefensemagazine.org/articles/2017/6/5/geospatial-agency-to-share-historicaldata-with-private-sector-start-ups.
315. Kris, supra note 224, at 227. In 2008, Ken Wainstein, then-Assistant Attorney General
for National Security in the Department of Justice, described the government’s reliance on
technology companies to facilitate surveillance:
[W]e rely on the communications providers to do our intelligence surveillances. We
can’t do [the surveillances] without them because . . . we . . . don’t own the
communications systems. We need to rely on their assistance. . . . Yes, we can compel
the phone companies, or compel the communications providers to do a surveillance, and
even if they . . . resist a directive . . . we can go to the FISA Court to get our orders
enforced. Problem is, throughout that time, we’re dark on whatever surveillance it is that
we want to go up on.
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C. Cooperation with Foreign Entities and Compromising Key Strategic
Targets
As SIGINT collection under Executive Order 12333 becomes more important,
the Intelligence Community must increase its focus on obtaining the cooperation
of foreign entities and compromising key strategic targets. Partner arrangements
between governments and intelligence services to facilitate intelligence sharing
and access to key collection platforms and facilities is an incredibly important
aspect of intelligence collection.316 As Section 702 becomes less useful in the
future, the United States will need to rely more on foreign governments to share
intelligence and encourage technology companies within those foreign nations
to cooperate with the United States. These intelligence-sharing relationships
will help the United States Intelligence Community gain access to pristine and
complete communications in a safer environment, which are important factors
that have made Section 702 such a vital intelligence gathering authority. 317
Relationships and deals between intelligence services and allied governments
can always entail certain limitations, though, such as the need to provide more
robust privacy protections to citizens of another country in the SIGINT that is
obtained as a result of an arrangement than would otherwise be provided or use
restrictions on the intelligence that is shared. 318 Nonetheless, the tradeoffs
typically favor engaging in these intelligence relationships unless the same
information can be collected in another manner because the United States will
almost certainly always be better off with more intelligence. 319
The United States must increase the amount of resources that it devotes to
effectively compromising key strategic targets. Some of this will be
accomplished by human intelligence (HUMINT) operations—this can be
thought of as HUMINT enabled SIGINT. Intelligence officers may be able to
recruit assets inside foreign technology companies that can provide access to
those communications systems or develop fruitful relationships with the leaders
of key strategic foreign technology companies.320
The Intelligence Community will also need to increase its exploitation of
vulnerabilities (i.e., conduct more remote hacking operations) for SIGINT
collection as the amount of fruitful intelligence obtained under Section 702
diminishes. It takes significant time and resources to find vulnerabilities and
Id.
316. Ashley S. Deeks, A (Qualified) Defense of Secret Agreements, 49 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 713, 741–
44 (2017); Ashley Deeks, Intelligence Communities, Peer Constraints, and the Law, 7 HARV.
NAT’L SEC. J. 1, 6–10 (2016).
317. See supra Part I.C.
318. Deeks, Intelligence Communities, Peer Constraints, and the Law, supra note 316, at 10–
11; Interview with Robert S. Litt, supra note 210.
319. Interview with Eric Greenwald, supra note 308.
320. Interview with Eric Greenwald, supra note 308; Interview with Benjamin Wittes, supra
note 161.
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money to purchase vulnerabilities, as well as significant effort to develop the
tools to exploit these vulnerabilities. 321 These vulnerabilities are transient,
though, as eventually they are discovered and patched or new products and
services are developed that do not have the same vulnerabilities.322 This means
that the Intelligence Community will constantly need to innovate to exploit
vulnerabilities to be able to collect SIGINT at scale. Many of these capabilities
will depend on investing in research and development, talented personnel, and
the necessary infrastructure to conduct these intelligence operations.323
Increased aggressiveness in exploiting vulnerabilities to conduct SIGINT
operations could result in diplomatic blowback when operations are discovered.
The foreign policy challenges and strained alliance relationships that can result
from disclosed intelligence operations are important factors to consider at the
outset of deciding whether to conduct intelligence operations.324 The risk of
blowback can therefore be a key limitation on intelligence operations. While
there was a great deal of diplomatic backlash following the Snowden
disclosures, there is a general understanding among nations that countries spy
on one another.325 The key question of whether to proceed with an operation or
whether the risks are too great to proceed will always be a context dependent
inquiry. Intelligence officials will have to weigh the value of the target, the
country or countries that will be affected by the operation and their relationship
with the United States, the threat environment and diplomatic challenges that are
present at a given point in time, and other factors when deciding whether to
conduct operations while being mindful that operations seldom stay secret
forever.
This increased reliance on exploiting vulnerabilities will lead to increased
debate over when the government should disclose vulnerabilities to vendors or
hold onto these vulnerabilities. The Vulnerabilities Equities Process (VEP),
which is the process that the United States government has created to decide
321. Susan Hennessey, Lawful Hacking and the Case for a Strategic Approach to “Going
Dark”, BROOKINGS INST. (Oct. 7, 2016), https://www.brookings.edu/research/lawful-hackingand-the-case-for-a-strategic-approach-to-going-dark/; Interview with Robert S. Litt, supra note
210.
322. See HAYDEN, supra note 92, at 421 (acknowledging that SIGINT advantages are
temporary).
323. Interview with Eric Greenwald, supra note 308.
324. See Manpearl, supra note 227, at 354 (describing the intense foreign policy backlash to
the Snowden disclosures that led the United States to institute voluntary surveillance reforms);
Courtney Weldon, Steve Brackin & Eric Manpearl, National Security Council Oversight of U.S.
Intelligence Activities, in INTELLIGENCE AND NATIONAL SECURITY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY 3, 8–
9 (discussing the importance of developing contingency plans for managing the unauthorized
disclosure of sensitive intelligence collection programs).
325. See Ashley S. Deeks, Confronting and Adapting: Intelligence Agencies and International
Law, 102 VA. L. REV. 599, 609–10 (2016) (detailing several instances of government leaders
openly talking about the importance of intelligence).
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when the government should disclose previously unknown (zero-day)
vulnerabilities, has already sparked rigorous debate on this topic.326 While the
government has important intelligence, military, and law enforcement interests
in discovering and keeping vulnerabilities to exploit, there are also valid
cybersecurity reasons for disclosing some vulnerabilities and United States
technology companies that may benefit from vulnerability disclosure are an
important part of the United States economy. In addition to the important
intelligence that will increasingly be gathered through the exploitation of
vulnerabilities—and likely will not be able to be collected through other
means—which weigh in favor of holding onto vulnerabilities, disclosing
vulnerabilities may risk potentially informing adversaries about the United
States Intelligence Community’s sources and methods.327 Further, the United
States’ adversaries do not engage in similar vulnerability disclosure programs,
which could potentially put the United States in an intelligence gathering and
military disadvantage in the future relative to adversary countries that are able
to continuously stockpile vulnerabilities without disclosing them.328
On the other hand, there are salient arguments in favor of disclosure.
Disclosing vulnerabilities enables companies to patch the vulnerabilities, thus
fixing their products.329 This improves cybersecurity overall and helps these
companies to have more secure products. 330 For the last several years, the
United States Intelligence Community has listed the cyber threat as the top threat
in its worldwide threat assessment report and United States companies lose
hundreds of billions of dollars in intellectual property theft per year.331 Further,
326. WHITE HOUSE, VULNERABILITIES EQUITIES POLICY AND PROCESS FOR THE UNITED
STATES GOVERNMENT 1 (2017), https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/whitehouse.gov/files/images/
External%20-%20Unclassified%20VEP%20Charter%20FINAL.PDF.
327. Dave Aitel & Matt Tait, Everything You Know About the Vulnerabilities Equities Process
is Wrong, LAWFARE (Aug. 18, 2016, 2:46 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/everything-youknow-about-vulnerability-equities-process-wrong.
328. Id.
329. Michael Daniel, Heartbleed: Understanding When We Disclose Cyber Vulnerabilities,
WHITE HOUSE (Apr. 28, 2014, 3:00 PM), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/blog/2014/04/28/
heartbleed-understanding-when-we-disclose-cyber-vulnerabilities; ARI SCHWARTZ & ROB
KNAKE, BELFER CTR. FOR SCI. & INT’L AFFAIRS, GOVERNMENT’S ROLE IN VULNERABILITY
DISCLOSURE
1,
3,
5
(2016),
https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/vulnerability-disclosure-webfinal3.pdf.
330. Daniel, supra note 329.
331. DANIEL R. COATS, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE
RECORD, WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 5–7
(2019), https://www.dni.gov/files/ODNI/documents/2019-ATA-SFR—-SSCI.pdf; DANIEL R.
COATS, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD, WORLDWIDE
THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 5–6 (2018),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/2018-ATA—-UnclassifiedSSCI.pdf; DANIEL R. COATS, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE
RECORD, WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1–3
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adversary nations may discover the same vulnerability as the United States has
discovered and may seek to use the vulnerability to target United States interests,
which would weigh heavily in favor of disclosure in such situations.
There will certainly be situations in which it is an easy call not to disclose.
For example, the United States should obviously not disclose a vulnerability
when the United States discovers a vulnerability in a foreign adversary
government’s system that the foreign country contracted for with a foreign
company in that country. A vulnerability that has little intelligence value yet
exists on systems that many Americans use would be an obvious example of a
situation in which the government should disclose. The more difficult decisions
are those that implicate important offensive and defensive interests. United
States officials will have to consider the likelihood that another group will also
discover the vulnerability, the risk of a leak of the vulnerability, how quickly a
vendor could develop a patch for the vulnerability and how widespread the
adoption of the patch would be, the importance of the target the vulnerability is
being used on, and the susceptibility of United States interests to the same
vulnerability among other important considerations when deciding whether to
hold onto or disclose a vulnerability.
D. Technical Investments to Improve Analysis Capabilities
Beyond enhancing SIGINT collection capabilities, the Intelligence
Community must focus on improving the ability to conduct intelligence analysis
at scale. As numerous observers have noted, “the increase in the total amount
of data also creates problems in the form of ever-larger haystacks in which the
government must find the needles.”332 Perhaps a more apt analogy is that it is

(2017),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Newsroom/Testimonies/SSCI%20Unclassified%20SFR%2
0-%20Final.pdf; JAMES R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR
THE RECORD, WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1–4
(2016),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/SASC_Unclassified_2016_ATA_SFR_FINAL.pdf; JAMES
R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD,
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1–4 (2015),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Unclassified_2015_ATA_SFR_-_SASC_FINAL.pdf; JAMES
R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR THE RECORD,
WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1–3 (2014),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/2014%20WWTA%20%20SFR_SS
CI_29_Jan.pdf; JAMES R. CLAPPER, OFFICE OF THE DIR. NAT’L INTELLIGENCE, STATEMENT FOR
THE RECORD, WORLDWIDE THREAT ASSESSMENT OF THE U.S. INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY 1–3
(2013),
https://www.dni.gov/files/documents/Intelligence%20Reports/UNCLASS_2013%20ATA%20SFR
%20FINAL%20for%20SASC%2018%20Apr%202013.pdf.
332. Kris, supra note 65, at 417.
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“like looking for a needle in a stack of needles” 333 as important pieces of
intelligence do not necessarily stand out in the sea of information—analysts
must sift through the massive quantities of information to determine what is
important. 334 The great value in SIGINT collection can only be realized if
analysts are able to find the useful pieces of information.
Unlike downstream collection under Section 702 in which the
communications “to” and “from” a selector are provided to the NSA in a manner
that is highly likely to yield intact copies of the entirety of the communications,
Executive Order 12333 collection cannot necessarily provide such tailored
acquisition. The Intelligence Community must invest in developing and
purchasing the technological tools, such as artificial intelligence, that can assist
in conducting intelligence analysis at scale to be able to sift through massive
quantities of data.335 These tools will play an increasingly critical role in sorting
through data to find useful intelligence, and can be leveraged to improve the
usefulness of SIGINT collection under Executive Order 12333.336 Further, the
Intelligence Community should continue to invest in machine translation tools.
Linguistic analysis has been a limiting factor for all intelligence agencies, and
this problem will only get worse as more data is generated.337 There will not be

333. CTR. FOR DIG. CONTENT, UNTANGLING THE WEB: A GUIDE TO INTERNET RESEARCH 12
(2007); Interview with Eric Greenwald, supra note 308.
334. Calhoun, supra note 313; CTR. FOR DIG. CONTENT, supra note 333 at 12; Interview with
Eric Greenwald, supra note 308.
335. GREG ALLEN & TANIEL CHAN, BELFER CTR. STUDY, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE AND
NATIONAL SECURITY 27–28 (2017), https://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/files/
publication/AI%20NatSec%20-%20final.pdf; Magnuson, supra note 314.
336. Melissa Drisko, the former Deputy Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA),
has stated that “[w]e have to be much more data-centric, much more savvy in how we handle data
. . . . There are secrets there that we got to find. It’s how do you find those.” Lauren C. Williams,
Spy Chiefs Set Sights on AI and Cyber, FCW (Sept. 7, 2017), https://fcw.com/articles/2017/09/07/
intel-insa-ai-tech-chiefs-insa.aspx.
Drisko concluded that “algorithmic analysis, artificial
intelligence, [and] machine learning” will play a key role in finding important intelligence. Id. See
Amaani Lyle, National Security Experts Examine Intelligence Challenges at Summit, U.S. DEP’T
OF
DEF.
(Sept.
9,
2016),
https://www.defense.gov/News/Article/Article/938941/national-security-experts-examineintelligence-challenges-at-summit/ (summarizing Intelligence Community leaders’ discussion of
the necessity of using artificial intelligence); Jenna McLaughlin, Artificial Intelligence will Put
Spies Out of Work, Too, FOREIGN POLICY (June 9, 2017, 2:37 PM),
http://foreignpolicy.com/2017/06/09/artificial-intelligence-will-put-spies-out-of-work-too/
(discussing NGA’s push to utilize artificial intelligence); Mark Pomerleau, Here’s How Technology
Can Help Unburden DIA Analysts, C4ISRNET (Aug. 4, 2017), https://www.c4isrnet.com/intelgeoint/isr/2017/08/04/heres-how-technology-can-help-unburden-dia-analysts/ (reporting on DIA’s
plan to adopt artificial intelligence to help analysts sift through a flood of data).
337. See, e.g., H.R. PERMANENT SELECT COMM. ON INTELLIGENCE, INTELLIGENCE
AUTHORIZATION ACT FOR FISCAL YEAR 2002, H.R. REP. NO. 107-219, at 19 (2001) (“The
principle agencies dealing with foreign intelligence—CIA, NSA, FBI, DIA and the military
services—have all admitted they do not have the language talents, in breadth or in depth, to fully
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enough human-hours to be able to translate communications by human linguists.
Instead, machine translation, though imperfect, can dramatically increase the
Intelligence Community’s efficiency in this area. Finally, the Intelligence
Community must invest in technologies that can work to piece packets of
communications together to form complete communications automatically by
drawing on data packets across multiple streams of SIGINT acquisition. A
tremendous advantage of Section 702 has been the ability to obtain precise and
complete communications, but as Section 702 becomes less useful, Executive
Order 12333 will need to make up for this lost intelligence.
V. CONCLUSION
Section 702 was a critical intelligence collection reform that addressed
technological developments to enable the Intelligence Community to acquire
vital foreign intelligence to protect United States national security interests and
inform policymakers. 338 Section 702 enables the Intelligence Community to
collect intelligence on non-United States persons that are reasonably believed to
be overseas when the Intelligence Community reasonably believes it will likely
acquire foreign intelligence from surveilling these individuals without having to
undergo the significant step of establishing probable cause that the target is an
agent of a foreign power, probable cause that each facility is being used or is
about to be used by a foreign power or agent of a foreign power, and that the
information could not be reasonably obtained by normal investigative
methods.339 The Intelligence Community would simply not be able to maintain
nearly the same level of intelligence collection without Section 702 if it were
forced to rely on FISA Title I. Also, Section 702 allows for collection to occur
in a stable and safe domestic environment. Under downstream, the
communications “to” and “from” a selector are even provided to the NSA in a
manner that is highly likely to yield intact copies of the entirety of the
communications.340
While the collection programs under Section 702 have produced a great deal
of valuable intelligence over the last decade, the United States must begin to
think about impending technological developments and strategically consider
how to conduct SIGINT collection in the future. The United States’ current legal
regime governing SIGINT activities is predicated on the location of the target.
If location becomes significantly difficult to determine because of the increased
and effectively accomplish their missions.”); see also Interview with Eric Greenwald, supra note
308.
338. INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 4–8.
339. Compare Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 Amendments Acts of 2008 § 702
(authorizing SIGINT collection targeting non-United States persons reasonably believed to be
overseas to acquire foreign intelligence information), with Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of
1978 §§ 104-105 (authorizing foreign intelligence collection under FISA Title I and establishing
the legal requirements for conducting such SIGINT activities).
340. INGLIS & KOSSEFF, supra note 20, at 4.
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prevalence and advancement of location-spoofing and anonymity technologies,
the United States may have to reconsider how location should factor into this
legal paradigm. Anonymity tools mask information about a user’s true identity
and location that can be critical for the NSA’s ability to lawfully target
individuals under Section 702. Although anonymity tools may not become
widespread, these technologies can still currently pose problems for the NSA
and the increased prevalence of illicit actors using anonymity technologies will
make the NSA’s work more difficult, especially in regard to illicit actors that
use sophisticated tradecraft. Location-spoofing technologies are very likely to
be widely adopted and may cause substantial problems for the NSA. Locationspoofing technologies make it appear as if communications are actually coming
from an intermediary computer instead of the original user, which can hide the
user’s true location. These technologies may hinder the NSA’s ability to target
individuals under Section 702 and could create a major resource problem for the
NSA in its post-tasking analysis or cause the NSA to have to detask targets and
lose the ability to gather intelligence on these targets.
In a world in which location becomes extremely difficult to accurately
determine, the United States should reform FISA to create a new category for
non-United States persons appearing to be located in the United States. These
individuals, who the Intelligence Community could not develop a reasonable
belief that they were outside the United States, but still reasonably believed were
non-United States persons, could still be targeted if the Intelligence Community
has reasonable suspicion that these individuals are likely to possess, receive,
and/or communicate foreign intelligence information rather than forcing the
NSA or FBI to establish probable cause that these individuals are agents of a
foreign power as long as the Intelligence Community has not conclusively
determined that these individuals are physically located inside the United States.
The FISC would be required to make this reasonable suspicion determination on
an individualized basis because of the privacy concerns that are implicated by
the fact that some of these targets that are non-United States persons appearing
to be located inside the United States will indeed actually be located inside the
United States and not just using technologies that make this appear to be the
case. If the Intelligence Community gained conclusive evidence that the target
is actually physically located inside the United States, then the Intelligence
Community would have one week to shift collection to FISA Title I. This reform
could take advantage of minimization at the point of collection to enhance
privacy protections for the United States persons that communicate with the nonUnited States person appearing to be located inside the United States target, and
data acquired under this new category could be tagged and treated as a special
category of information that has a relatively short retention period.
If this reform would still not be sufficient to address the significant problems
created by technological developments and the adoption of these technologies
such that SIGINT collection under Section 702 was severely hindered, it could
be necessary to reform FISA by creating two categories: one for United States
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persons and one for non-United States persons. Both of these reforms would
rely heavily on the foreign intelligence exception to the warrant clause in the
Fourth Amendment.
It may be prudent to create more forward leaning procedures to ease some of
the difficulties that could be caused by increased uncertainty of the location of
targets. One approach would be to build lists of IP addresses that are associated
with known VPN providers. If procedures allow for greater collection of
communications on the front-end, the Intelligence Community can develop
greater back-end privacy protections to ensure that collection efforts remain
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. Finally, the Intelligence Community
should be proactive in explaining the technological challenges that it faces to the
FISC. Ideally, a more proactive approach can create a more collaborative
environment where the NSA, DOJ, and FISC can find the proper balance of rules
and procedures that allow for the needed flexibility to adjust to new technical
challenges while providing adequate privacy protections for those who are
protected by the Fourth Amendment.
Further, Section 702 will likely become less useful in the future. The United
States’ home field advantage is receding, which means that the United States
will have a smaller share of the world’s communications traffic transit its
physical infrastructure.341 This will reduce the Intelligence Community’s ability
to acquire precise and intact communications by serving directives on United
States companies. The push towards data localization could diminish the
market share of United States companies and could exacerbate the trend
towards a smaller percentage of the world’s communications transiting the
United States. In addition, technology companies have begun to innovate in a
manner that reduces their capability to respond to lawful orders. Technology
companies have increasingly adopted encryption technologies and may shift
data overseas to try to avoid complying with lawful surveillance orders. As
Section 702 becomes less useful in the future, the Intelligence Community must
assess how it can improve collection under Executive Order 12333 to ensure
that the government continues to acquire vital intelligence to protect United
States national security interests.
One approach to alleviating the difficulties that encryption poses for Section
702 would be for Congress to enact a lawful access requirement.342 Encryption
would still pose a problem for SIGINT collection that occurs under Executive
Order 12333, which will become more important as the United States’ home
field advantage diminishes, regardless of whether Congress enacts a lawful
access requirement because technology companies outside of the United States
are also adopting these technologies. The NSA must therefore continue to invest
resources in being able to decrypt communications and acquiring unencrypted
communications. The United States government should continue to work to
341. Kris, supra note 65, at 416–17.
342. See, e.g., Manpearl, supra note 143, at 73–74.
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develop strong relationships with United States technology companies and seek
to mend to fissures that have been created in the aftermath of the Snowden
disclosures.
Also, as SIGINT collection under Executive Order 12333 becomes more
important, the Intelligence Community must increase its focus on obtaining the
cooperation of foreign entities and compromising key strategic targets. The
United States will need to rely more on foreign governments to share intelligence
and encourage technology companies within those foreign nations to cooperate
with the United States. The United States must increase the amount of resources
that it devotes to compromising key strategic targets effectively. Some of this
will be accomplished by HUMINT enabled SIGINT. The Intelligence
Community will also need to increase its exploitation of vulnerabilities for
SIGINT collection.
Finally, beyond enhancing SIGINT collection capabilities, the Intelligence
Community must focus on improving the ability to conduct intelligence analysis
at scale. The Intelligence Community must invest in developing and acquiring
technological tools that can assist in conducting intelligence analysis at scale to
be able to sift through massive quantities of data.
These reforms and strategic investments can help ensure that United States
SIGINT activities evolve to meet future technological developments and
continue to provide the necessary intelligence to protect United States national
security interests, the American people, and the Homeland.
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